Returned

A few possibilities which matter, but are probably not decisive: 1. Probably only a tiny fraction of humans on Roshar would be able to do this, at best. The logistics of getting enough people to usable Oathgates, the supplies they would need for the journey, equipment for crossing the seas of beads, and other considerations like those would all be very expensive and difficult to organize on short notice. This in turn prompts some tricky questions on which people are allowed to take the available slots to depart, and which people would be denied, and similar. 2. This is basically the same thing that happened when humans fled Ashyn for Roshar. I can see why repeating the process, even down to not having a solution for the problems that caused the exodus, might not be appealing. And where would they go this time? 3. Dalinar wouldn't be able to go, nor would any Radiant or spren. They're too Invested to leave the Rosharan system (with the knowledge they have available at that time). Abandoning all of the spren to destruction isn't very honorable, which Dalinar's entire arc led him to value. 4. This would almost certainly count as breaking the contract (by not participating in the contest or by deserting it while it's happening), which has consequences even worse than just losing and would not keep Odium contained on Roshar. 5. Even if Dalinar somehow could get all of the humans off of Roshar without violating the contract, that would imply that the Singers (if not Odium itself) could also leave. Inflicting Odium's soldiers on the Cosmere doesn't solve any problems, even if they left the Rosharan refugees alone. 6. The contract Dalinar strikes with Odium suggests, though does not guarantee, that the humans remaining on Roshar no longer face extermination even if Odium wins the contest proper. I wouldn't want to rely on that too much, but it is a factor. 7. Whatever else a person might think about Dalinar's solution, it forces the rest of the Cosmere to reckon with Odium. Roshar spent thousands of years paying the price for containing Odium, for the costless-to-them benefit of everyone else in the Cosmere, particularly the Shards. While I think the brilliance of the Sunmaker's Gambit is very overstated, Odium is a Shard-level problem and ultimately has to be dealt with by Shards, one way or another. I made a thread quite a while ago suggesting that the only way to deal with the problems Odium represents is to combine it with other Shards, which was accomplished here, and now it's the other Shards that have to deal with additional consequences rather than abandoning millions of people to Odium's depredations. 8. The entire point of Dalinar's decision to not kill Gavinor is that killing him wouldn't have solved much, or at least that's my take on it. Odium might not be able to actively damage Rosharans further but would still be able to threaten the rest of the Cosmere with agents working at his direction. That was his plan if he were to win anyways, he just really wanted Dalinar to be one of those agents. The Singers and Fused would still be present on Roshar, still be able to draw power from the Everstorm, and would still be able to prosecute wars against the human nations if they wanted (which the Fused almost certainly would). 9. That Odium agreed to the contract at all, even though he wasn't happy about it, basically proves that losing isn't a permanent issue for him. Losing the war more conventionally than losing the contest wouldn't have restricted him at all, as we saw was the case in the previous Desolations, so it seems unwise to assume that he would trade another temporary defeat of the same type for a guaranteed end to his ambitions forever. So even Dalinar winning the contest doesn't solve anything, it only buys some time. And time is dross to the immortal Odium, as the Stormfather described.

That's not the one. My recollection is that it was a character seeing a group of people, soldiers or mercenaries or something similar, and noting the variety of nationalities/ethnicities. It was mentioned that there was "even a Shin man" among them, or something like that. I think that I misremembered some detail, or just imagined the reference entirely, as I've just looked through every appearance of "shin" in all five books and did not find what I remembered. I could have missed it because there are so many occurrences of those letters (did you know that the word "lashing" is used kind of often? Shocking!), but I think I'm probably just wrong. Along the way I did manage to find a few more examples of variety among Rosharan groups, one of them from Dalinar's own perspective: And, damning enough to get its own quote box, a specific refutation from Szeth and Kaladin himself:

I had not, but it's a good find. It also occurs to me (so late!) that Shinovar is famously reclusive and so most Rosharans probably don't have much actual experience with it or with Shin people. If you've only seen five or six Shin people in your entire life I can imagine drawing the wrong conclusion, that the traits you noticed in them are shared by all Shin. Another good note, and one that I had completely forgotten (I need to reread WaT a time or two more, clearly). I'm curious about some of the relative descriptions now-- are the darker-skinned Shin still more pale than Vedens, for example? It's also interesting that the Shin are the only nation presented so specifically as not being homogenous in this way, though others, like Kharbranth or Tashikk, don't seem to have even a hint of this pattern. Possibly Ishikk is not very knowledgeable about the world. I think that he is presented as being relatively savvy and wise, but that isn't the same thing as having the experience my earlier comments assume. It's a really good point to note that all of the characters are basing their observations on their own experience, and even the most worldly (like the Alethi high court, such as Adolin and Dalinar) are also going to be limited this way even if their experience is expansive. I also recall Rysn being utterly mystified by her first trade experience in Shinovar, and that section also emphasized how little interaction most of Roshar has with the entire country. I feel like I remember (but can't find) a comment somewhere in one of the books about it being rare for Shin to leave Shinovar to live elsewhere (I think it was in the context of seeing a Shin soldier? It wasn't about Szeth, I'm sure of that). In any case, I am convinced by you you two that the physical traits which definitely indicate nationality are overstated. I do think that the earlier books leaned into this, but maybe as a narrative device or to hint at other things that have been revealed (like mingling with Singers) more than as a description of something fundamental to Rosharan people. Some traits do still seem to be indicative and reliable (rocklike fingernails and Iriali hair), but the everyone-is-easily-identifiable-at-a-glance idea now seems too weak and under-supported to stand.

@Treamayne beat me to it, as usual, even as I was typing out the quotes and citations! I read the comments Treamayne noted as being a comparison that is Ishikk's best guess, but that specifically doesn't quite match properly because some of the traits (their physiques) are wrong for that guess. I can see another perspective on it, but for me the emphasis on the particular traits that don't fit is further support for what I said above. Traits being specifically wrong for the guess are just as indicative as every other case I can think of in the books, where the guesses are exactly right because the traits are exactly right There is one more item, regarding the third man (called Thinker here, but is Demoux) that I can still contribute: As with the other two, the Alethi guess is a comparison-- he looks like an Alethi, which is different from concluding that he is Alethi. That's immediately followed by a qualification that Ishikk thinks Demoux is not Alethi, with the eye shape not matching the rest of an Alethi's features as the key reason. I concede that Dyel's identification of Demoux as Shin could count as a Rosharan making an error, though I will note a couple of oddities: Dyel describes Demoux as having light skin while Ishikk specifically notes that Demoux has the same tan skin color as an Alethi, and the Shin are described (universally, always?) as being notably pale, more so than other groups (importantly, more pale than Vedens), including by Alethi observers (so the Shin skin tones may not overlap with others' much, if at all). We have some evidence of this: Dyel seems not to be very worldly, describing the man she thinks might be Azish as potentially being from "the far East" where the fiercest of warriors live. The "fiercest of warriors" part almost certainly would refer to Alethkar, and definitely not Azir. Azir is not known for the fiercest warriors and is nowhere near the Eastern edge of Roshar, though possibly Dyel imagines he is Azish and lives in the East. Guessing "the far East" suggests that she doesn't know the difference between Jah Keved and Alethkar, or maybe even know the names of either country. Though in fairness the travelers say that they are from "the East" with no other apparent detail given, so maybe Dyel is thinking in terms of what they said. Even then she rules out Demoux being from the East because of his accent. That Ishikk immediately thought "Alethi" based on Demoux's skin, while Dyel thought him pale, can imply a few things: Maybe there is a broader range of skin colors in Rosharan nations than I'm suggesting (though this clashes with every other Rosharan's accurate guesses in every other situation, and is problematic in light of the three quoted sections above), maybe Demoux's skin was tanned at the Purelake but the tan had faded by the time Dyel met him, or perhaps Dyel doesn't know anything about any far Easterners and has never seen one identified as Alethi, Veden, or anything else (lumping them in as "far Easterners" with Vedens, who are pale-skinned but not so much as the Shin, supports this, though the Siln, Bav, and Unkalaki people are also from Jah Keved and have tan skin, so that's not definitive). I think that it is reasonable to conclude that Dyel doesn't know enough to identify an Alethi, Veden, or any other Easterner by sight under any circumstances because she is particularly unknowledgeable about the world, and so she could not note the same details as Ishikk. But it is also reasonable to conclude that she knows enough to note those details and made an error in identifying Demoux. Even in this case, though, she would be the only character in all of SA (as far as I am aware) to make such an error.

I'm saying that the nationalities and ancestry on Roshar have, so far, been presented as having obviously identifiable physical traits, such as the Herdazian rock-like fingernails or Adolin's hair. Characters in the books have been able to immediately identify what country another character is from, or their ancestry, based on seeing those traits and have always been correct (as far as we know). It's possible that Sanderson is moving away from that situation, where a person's physical appearance reliably and instantly gives an observer this information. Gamma could be an example of this, as he is described as having "some" mixed heritage-- otherwise most characters are all Alethi, all Veden, all Horneater, all Herdazian, all Azish, all Shin, and so on, and characters immediately know. The other situation is Felt in Oathbringer. Dalinar can't tell where he's from, nor his ancestry, just by looking at him. He's just sort of generically foreign, which is a good sign that he's not from Roshar at all because otherwise Rosharans would be able to identify his original nationality/heritage just by looking at him, as they do with all the other characters. I believe the narrator's conclusion that Gamma is from Reshi and/or Herdazian lineage because, so far, every time a character has guessed another's lineage based on appearance they've been correct (again, as far as we know). If they did not immediately identify the lineage/original nationality, as with Felt, I would be more willing to believe Gamma might be a worldhopper.

One pretty consistent detail from the SA books is that identifying someone's heritage by looking at them is usually accurate, especially if we restrict the timeframe we're looking at-- Herdazians have their rock-like nails which seem to be a universal trait in that nation and rare (or absent) in all other groups, Iriali have their metallic golden hair, Thaylens have their eyebrows, the pallor and eye shape among the Shin, Alethi dark hair breeding true and with stripy locks when mixed with non-Alethi, etc. It seems rare, among the characters that we observe in the book, for there to be much mixing between groups in these sorts of details. So when Gamma is described as seeming to be somewhat Reshi or Herdazian, along with presumably his primarily Azish physical traits, I tend to believe the narrator's assessment. Contrast with Felt, who is specifically foreign in ways that Dalinar can't place during Oathbringer. Maybe Sanderson is moving away from the nationality-as-conspicuous-ethnic-group formula on Roshar (we see plenty of worldhoppers in RoW that aren't described as hard to place or obviously different), but to date Rosharans have been really accurate at identifying other Rosharans' nationalities and lineages this way.

It's Kholin, though previously it was stated that she kept it as Davar: That's how it worked for Navani and Ialai, so presumably the same reasoning plays out for Shallan. Her role in the princedom make it more important to associate her with the ruling family than her previous one, not unlike Amaram taking the name Sadeas when he was elevated in Oathbringer.

I'm curious if Retribution will create any more Fused, new brands or otherwise. According to Leshwi, Odium stopped making Singers into Fused pretty early in his campaigns on Roshar. Surely there is a reason for that, especially through the events of WaT when so many of them were deteriorated so badly. He's also effectively won on Roshar for the time being and so probably doesn't need to expand the elite circle of his armies, especially if he can't get them out of the Rosharan system. I also think that injecting Honor's power into his autonomous servants is a dangerous move for him given that Honor is more self-aware and has been moving towards self-determination for quite a while. I don't think that taking up Honor will lead to a stable condition alongside Odium and so a lot of Rayse's old tricks I like @JustQuestin2004's idea and will take it further. I could see a brand based around Adhesion that helps unify opposition, especially vengeful opposition, to others. Mobs that undermine the government, pogroms that raze neighborhoods over some feud. The idea is that the people come together and organize (or be susceptible to organization) but only in the context of lashing out over perceived wrongs. People unify, but only to exact retribution, and then fracture once they've done that. They'd be great provocateurs and infiltrators, needing no supplies but Voidlight and any existing grievance held by people in an area. Dropping a handful on another planet could enflame disputes and cause civil wars, rebellions, and dedicated subversion along fault lines that already exist, leaving very few of Retribution's fingerprints behind while forcing his opposition to focus internally rather than externally (including at him).

It's definitely an issue, especially as power inflation has expanded through the different settings. It's possible for the Shards to potentially not be stupid but also be arbitrarily limited for one reason or another (which seems to be the case), but it's not satisfying. High-powered non-Shards will have the same issue but will probably not have access to the same excuse.

Not to pat myself on the back too much, but my predictions on this item were pretty good and were direct extensions of the state of play at the end of RoW. The specific details needed to correctly predict the shape of the contest itself and its relation to the conflict were included in the text and not really hidden. It wasn't a rug pull. I definitely agree with you that the text should have done more to highlight that, though. The emphasis on the contest was a mislead but way overplayed, way too frequently brought up, and barely questioned by anyone. Many of the characters in the book are not only capable of discerning the relevant details, they are astute enough that it's shocking to find them with such a direct, even naïve, set of expectations about the contest when it's existentially important to them. Worst of all is Hoid. He, more than anyone else, should have relied the least on the contract (even though he helped draft it) and been the most assiduous in making contingency plans. It's a bizarre oversight for him given his expansive knowledge and cunning. It also felt like a bit of a cheat for him to be so uninvolved in dealing with the contract failing because he just had to imitate some key people.

While I agree with this sentiment in terms of how the contest was set up in the text, I think that its ultimate impotence was predictable. Indeed, I am on record here as stating, well in advance of WaT, that the contest of champions either would not occur or would not be what was implied way back when Dalinar's vision first brought it up. I did expect that it would be replaced by something substantial as a different climax for the book, a prediction that was not borne out.

I hope you power through book 9 at least, if you find any of the middle books to be a slog. Many people complain about books in the 6-9 range and stop reading (though I personally feel that only book 8 is weak enough to justify the complaints, that book was a slog for me!), but the final books are worth it.

@Qianweilian Thanks! I thought it looked longer than it should but didn't look through it in enough detail after posting. I think it came from pulling quotes from page two while the post itself wound up on page three-- the page didn't respond in the normal way of closing the editing box, and I clicked post twice in confusion.

My position, maybe overstated, is that the philosophy in the books is shallow. Opinions can certainly vary on that, and if someone finds more of that in the books than I do I respect it. The issue is that we're talking about the moral state accomplished by a Shard's direct control (still underdefined, but we can probably continue to do passably well without nailing it down). The OP's assertion that we are evaluating is whether or not a morally excellent, benevolent Shard's direct control will result in better ethical states than any other possible arrangement. Upthread you suggested that Cultivation is not doing this as much as she ought to, with the assumptions made in the OP, which makes this comment confusing to me-- if less interventionist Shards still count as equally dominating as a micromanaging, constantly intervening Shard then I start to lose track of what we're talking about. It seems like a shift from earlier discussion, maybe I'm not thinking of it from the right angle. Its origins don't matter much to its use as a moral dilemma. It's not a thought experiment, it's a vehicle for thinking about what defines goodness in a framework of action, inaction, and constrained outcomes. The emergency room triage example I provided should abolish any doubt about the legitimacy of the dilemma or its ability to be related to concrete situations. I absolutely agree that ethical decisions are not tidily reducible. But if we aren't able to compare ethical states to one another then how can the question in the OP be evaluated or approached? The rub in this is that the end states described in the OP (the direct results of the Shard's direct intervention) are asserted to lead to more-than-alternatives-can-produce happiness and human flourishing, else they wouldn't be the things the Shard pursues. To my initial (maybe incorrect) reading the things the Shard enforces are presented as inseparable from the "true" ends. If the connection between those is weakened (to account for variation in human behaviors, uneven participation in the conditions the Shard enacts, or other things) then would we not have to question the value of the Shard's direct, constant intervention? If human happiness and flourishing is the end we value, why is it unacceptable to consider whether or not maximal Shardic control (or the methods which achieve it) cuts against those things? I didn't say that Shardic intervention is inherently immoral, I stated that there are ways of thinking about these topics which suggest that domination may itself be undesirable, have unethical qualities along with anything else they produce, be unable to produce specific outcomes or states, or otherwise introduce complications which detract from the goal in the OP. I gave a specific example of this when asked, the bedridden world case, which accomplishes every state described as "good" in the OP while maximizing the use of unique abilities of a Shard as well as direct Shardic intervention. That is, I described a situation in which a Shard could intervene as much as possible, in ways no non-Shard could, to achieve the things the OP lays out as desirable, but is not necessarily better than the states achievable by other agents. As the question is whether or not it is certainly better to live under Shardic domination this seems to me to be exactly relevant: it is not, as scenarios like this one are possible and valid under the assumptions but are not better. I think I've been pretty forward in sharing my thoughts and disagreements, and the reasons for them, with the assertion presented in the OP and have spent considerable time and effort to express those in good faith and engage honestly in discussion. I'm not copping out on anything, and my reticence to get into specifics is because I have suspected you will dismiss them out of hand or decline to evaluate them in the context in which they were given, which was the case here ("obviously I don't mean that"). This is one of the reasons I perceive so much circularity in the original question and the considerations you've presented around it: specific examples which are problematic to the premise are discounted by appealing to abstraction, and in the process define out anything besides the premise itself. That may not be an accurate description (maybe things are being lost in translation or I am otherwise just not getting it), but it is sincere. In any case I'm not sure there's much to be gained from continuing in this thread (me, that is, there are robust discussions with others still underway). I do not see that constant, direct intervention by a morally excellent and benevolent Shardic tyrant is necessarily better at achieving ethically desirable states (or the underdefined "human flourishing") than any other possible arrangement-- Taravnagian is not right. After a good deal of back and forth I am more convinced of this than before, and find the arguments for the assertion in the OP to be weaker and less convincing than at the outset. It's fine for anyone to disagree with that conclusion.

Assume whatever you like, but the Shard-tyrant is not a "political leader" in the sense that a mortal leader is. Assuming a consequentialist mode is fine if you want to assert it (it's your hypothetical situation), but it inherently assumes a huge amount into the question-- exactly as in your "good" leader example above. No, though I agree that it is not explicitly philosophical literature. My argument is that the books include scenarios but does very little to engage with their ethical properties. Dalinar and Taravangian talk a bit about the hogmen problem, assert their positions (simplistically), disagree, and then separate. There isn't expansion of those ideas into the broader wars or how Dalinar prosecutes them, for example, even though there are plenty of points where the ideas may intersect. It's as if the book asked a hoary question like "would you steal a loaf of bread to feed your starving family", character A says yes, character B says no, and the book just moves on. Little depth, and little that would prompt a reader to do anything beyond project their pre-existing conclusions into the book (as opposed to reconsidering what they think or why). It means that what you appeal to as "common sense", and what is a shift in a population's views about what is good or right and what is a temporary deviation which doesn't count, seems extremely unsound and projects your own views onto society generally. "Moral intuition", in the form I most often encounter it, suggests that people have "gut feelings" about the moral qualities that objects, events, and behaviors possess. It does not suggest that those intuitions are correct or useful (though derivations from those might be) and does not account for contradictory moral intuitions (racism is bad vs. racial apartheid is good, for a blunt example). But if you don't believe it and are not using in your arguments we can leave it aside. I think it's fine to avoid nailing down specific states which are "good" for this thread's questions, if difficult due to abstraction, because the question is about execution rather than determining what is "good" (since moral excellence of the Shard is already assumed). Famous dilemmas are usually very contrived, but the idea that they are all irredeemably disconnected from reality is false. Emergency room triage staff make decisions like the trolley problem every day, for example. As above we can probably dispense with specific situations (since the moral excellence of the Shard is assumed), but the question fundamentally assumes that the Shard can deliver results-- that's what its direct control is for here. The more fuzziness we inject into the Shard's ability to effect or produce good states, the less meaningful the Shard's tyranny becomes. And I look askance at saying famous moral dilemmas are irrelevant because they're disconnected from reality while simultaneously talking about a Shard magically dominating everything and everyone. Except that it seems like this doesn't matter to you. Your argument, as I understand it, is that the means the Shard uses are irrelevant because only the outcomes matter in your evaluation. I'm also unclear about why the political/social organization is so important, because the Shard is exerting direct control everywhere that it matters to an outcome's goodness, so the actual organization is always going to be a dictatorship. The question assumes that the Shard will fix things where it can. My critique here is that the outcomes may not be achievable (the Shard can't fix some problem X and so their society needs to reckon with that problem's existence while still trying to claim goodness, even of a relative kind, and those tensions and decisions matter to the outcome). Even in cases where it is achievable the methods can still be relevant-- if the Shard reads everyone's mind, Preservation style, and then executes everyone with views that promote X, is that a fix? Maybe. But it will never depend on institutions or structures because the Shard can't be limited by them (it must intervening maximally). This misses the point. My claim is that it is the assumptions that define the situation: the moral excellence and benevolence are the factors that matter. We get the same results from any leadership with those same properties. It's not more unreasonable to suggest a succession of leaders with those traits than it is to suggest one that is also a Shard. A Shard definitely has more reach but that doesn't guarantee more or better results (Rashek and Vin had issues during their brief ascensions, and their mistakes were costly and sometimes irreparable). [...] Almost. My argument is that Shards are not inherently more able to achieve specific ethical outcomes or states unless we assume that they won't. Shards don't need to necessarily fail, only potentially, for their moral excellence and benevolence to fail to deliver. Shards have more power and reach than mortals for sure, but that doesn't mean better outcomes in aggregate with them. If we imagine ethical states or outcomes as a normal distribution around zero (I know it's ridiculous, but bear with me), with negative numbers being "bad" and positive being "good", we might say a mortal's distribution runs from -10 to 10: their good states are balanced by their bad states. A Shards might run from -1,000 to 1,000, which indicates their actions are more extreme in their infliction of goodness or badness, but the mean is still zero. The net ethical outcome of both groups is the same (zero), but individual actions taken by the Shard contain more goodness or badness than the the mortals' because of the Shard's greater reach and power. More, but not necessarily better. What your argument claims (again, to my understanding of it) is that the mortals and the Shards will not have the same distribution. Instead, the Shard's distribution will be shifted or differently shaped such that its average is greater than that of the mortals. Departing from the clunky distribution analogy, the Shard needs to do a better job of delivering results through its interventions than any other being or arrangement could in order to achieve what the OP lays out. That means it necessarily needs to be less fallible and better at intervening than the alternatives, which may or may not be true, but is the whole discussion. As to the "conditions of mortals' lives' [...]", I have flirted with describing it many times but not gone into much detail as it seems clear that you are taking a strongly materialist and consequentialist stance, and so will just reject anything else, with an escape hatch of "common sense" to elide details. Consider a world in which a Shard severs the spine just below the neck at birth, leaving all mortals quadriplegic, and keeps each person isolated in a bed in a cell. The Shard directly magics nutrition and medicine into people, and waste out, as needed such that they live as long as is physically possible. This is a world which meets the criteria you laid out: there is no prejudice, no relative injustice, no hunger, no death save from old age, no war, no physical nor emotional violence of any kind, the Shard is directly intervening constantly, etc. I doubt you'll endorse that, despite it being uniquely available to a Shard, its consequentialist tidiness, and its satisfaction of the listed criteria. We might say that despite that satisfaction, removing people's agency and ability to experience things so utterly is bad, as an easy example of its shortcomings. Less extreme examples are fairer, if less clear. So in summary, the moral/ethical dimension of the question is non-unique (mortals and their organizations can also be asserted to be morally excellent and benevolent just as soundly), the capacity of the Shard to act is unique but is not necessarily more able to produce precisely the states and outcomes we want (saying "the Shard can just make a religion or something, or fiddle with tax rates" doesn't cut it, because it's the assumption of efficacy that is at issue), and it's possible that strong, direct interventions (uniquely available to a Shard) to accomplish some goal can also include "bad" properties that cut against the "extra" goodness the Shard is presumed to be able to deliver.

I agree 100%. It's worse than just polish, though. WaT just doesn't have the same tightness and structure present in earlier Sanderson works. I don't think it holds a candle to The Final Empire. It would have needed major revisions, whole sections being changed, moved, in some cases removed, to fit together in the "old" Sanderson mode. With more subtlety and elegance WaT could have been a masterpiece, but instead a lot of stuff just felt... jammed in, like an exposition dump. Old promises that need to be met technically are, but not in a satisfying way. New ideas are throttled mainly to reserve content for future releases. More recent Cosmere releases read to me like they're first drafts or essentially basic expansions of their original outlines, like a 7th grader's early three-paragraph essays (plus introduction and conclusion). We've been losing a lot of artistry and craft in exchange for more works more quickly. What I like about Sanderson's writing has generally been that I find it good and interesting, not just that it exists, and that's what made me a fan in the first place. An assembly line pace of output, if it comes with lower quality, feels disrespectful to the dedicated fan base.

I wouldn't say that a big budget is required, exactly, but it makes a big difference. There's also an element of how much it costs to develop, produce, and distribute any sort of television show or movie-- "low budget" usually still reflects a lot of money. I've been a fan of animation for over 30 years and I can confidently tell you that yes, it really could cost "so much" to do 2D animation with a "decent" art style. I've seen many animations and it can be obvious where the lack of budget shows through. Low budgets also force a lot of tradeoffs, like compressing characters or events into fewer episodes or leaving them out entirely, more reuse of shots/animations, less detail in artwork, fewer frames and so lower-quality animation, worse or less music, less capable writing, and so many others. Bigger budgets don't guarantee that everything will be great but less money can force a lot of issues that otherwise wouldn't be there. Cheap voice actors are often not very good (that's why they're cheap), though of course not everyone will like or dislike given voice actors in specific roles. A poorly chosen cast tends to ruin an animated work for me, even if the show is otherwise one I like. It's also a ton of work to create a show or movie from start to finish, and the upfront money to do it has to come from somewhere. Making money off of an animated show or movie is also a lot different than it used to be before streaming and is a lot more tenuous. Different groups financing shows can sometimes impose weird conditions which may force additional production issues or alter the work in ways the creator and fans may not like. There are a lot of moving parts, and Sanderson already has a decent amount of experience with trying to adapt some of his works (the ever-promised Mistborn movie). If he's not excited nor confident about doing an animation I would wager that's based on his actual experience and not some random idea or bias he has. I'm very sympathetic to wanting adaptations of books I love. But over my life I've also seen a lot of adaptations that I thought were not very good, and I'd rather have no adaptation than a bad one that I don't enjoy. A Way of Kings show that is cheap in animation, art, voice cast, and music, which doesn't really follow the books' plot nor capture the details that make me like the book in the first place isn't a show that I want at all. Especially since a "bad" and poorly received adaptation might make it less likely that any additional adaptations might be attempted, so the bad one is the only one that will ever exist. I would love to have great Cosmere adaptations. But the quality of the product is a necessary element to me. I've had far too much experience with adaptations that offer little beyond the franchise name to push or demand. It's very monkey's paw.

I definitely recommend the first one, The Memory of Earth, at least. It directly involves a lot of the ideas in this thread. Unrelatedly I made some edits to my previous post while you were writing your response, particularly at the end, which may or may not include things to which you'd like to respond. If not, no worries and there is nothing to change. Having a goal doesn't mean that one is a consequentialist, nor that they'll do anything at all in order to achieve that goal. We don't know what the full scope of her goals even is, never mind how much success she's had in achieving them. Cultivation's scheming killed Rayse, which is a pretty final event to their antagonism, and completely thwarted Rayse's goal of killing her, which is a pretty decisive victory. It's not obvious that Cultivation cares much about the state of Roshar's people, at least to value one group over another. Saying the word "utilitarianism" isn't the same as presenting moral information nor engaging with it in any way. We get Taravangian's reasoning towards a utilitarian conclusion ("hang all four"), along with Dalinar's revulsion at that conclusion, but there isn't much detail or discussion about whether or not one of their answers is better than the other, nor why. They disagree, neither convinces the other by stating their position, and that's it. Ultra-subjective, semi-presentist, and optimistic. While I find Trumpism to be horrifying, the reason I brought it up is that there are a lot of people who feel that "starving children in Africa is wrong" is not a correct moral position. Those people's moral views are probably about as thoughtfully considered as anyone else's. It is nice to think that people generally are morally cohesive around ideas that are broadly correct, but the idea that common sense morality is something that neatly excises other views or otherwise makes them not count is not a sound one. In my experience people appealing to common sense as their moral foundation tend to just mean the views they happen to already hold, common or not, to the extent that they've thought them through. As for support of genocide, that (sadly) depends very much on the polity and group. There are plenty of ardent supporters all the time, with disturbing increases at particular times. I'm not really impressed with this very oblique appeal to a "heavy" focus on moral intuition, as a general thing or as a support of innate morality, though I might not be understanding why you've invoked it. Not at all what I'm saying. You are asserting that the Shard tyrant will make the best decisions on these matters and have set up a system in which their decision is the only factor in what happens, and as such it doesn't seem unreasonable to inquire further about cases which aren't tidy or obvious. The whole point of the exercise is to assess the circumstances of the Shard's absolute rule, and relegating a lot of those circumstances to "I don't know and it can't be known and it's unfair to ask, but the Shard is still the best" seems unreasonable. Unless you are saying that the means don't matter at all, it's fair to ask why one approach is going to be assumed over any other, especially when you're optimizing across a large array of things the Shard will directly impose the tradeoffs among them will at least sometimes be important. I won't push on this particular point but without more granularity we can't get beyond the "assuming that X is the best, is anything better than X?" dimension I've brought up a few times. I'm not sure this is sound, and while I'll agree that improvements through sociology are possible it's not clear to me how the Shard will impose them. "The Shard will fix racism" is a bold claim, even if we were to agree that the Shard could do a lot to mitigate or avoid effects of racism. Increasing taxes is not a very neat solution to wealth inequality, the underlying issue and economies more generally being quite complicated, changeable, and often not amenable to tax-based incentives. It also matters how, precisely, the Shard intervenes. But these are more tangential, as you've stated that the Shard doesn't need to achieve perfection but instead needs only be better than some likely alternative. The issue is more around how solve-able some of these issues are and, if not solved, how much they will frustrate the Shard's intended forms of society. I don't see how this works without the assumption of a morally excellent, benevolent Shard. Shardic domination is the case on Taldain and Nalthis, but neither strikes me as an ideal or even particularly excellent society. It's the assumed benevolence and moral excellence that's doing the work, not the singular domination. In which case, what does the Shard matter to the equation? Why not assume morally excellent, benevolent, mundane leaders? We certainly violate some of what we know of human nature to make those assumptions, but we're already violating some of what we know of Shardic nature to make the assumptions for them. Interesting to pick Nozick out of that list! But regardless I presented that list as a counterpoint to the claimed common-sense source of moral determination and reasoning and your challenge to present an alternative framework. My position with the numbered items in the list is both that "common sense morality" is not solid enough to be fairly considered as a framework (items 1 and 2), and that items 3-5 are issues with how the original question is constructed and posed, and that those problems are logical issues rather than instances of disagreement with the particulars of specific views of ethics. That's fair enough, though the effects of the arrangement that has them dominated by the Shard are part and parcel of the entire question. We can easily claim that the best society is one in which the governed have agency in how they are governed, for example, in which case their domination inherently harms that claim. It's trivial to reject both premises, as there is no particular reason presented to accept either. But let's grant the first, since "ought" gets difficult to work with. It's the second that needs support and still lacks it. I'm willing to say that Shardic intervention might be effective at improving the lives of mortals. It could also be ineffective, or actively harmful. Shards are not free from uncertainty of outcome, so the outcomes of their actions are not knowable in terms of their efficacy (think of Rashek when he first took up the Well). Shards are also not constrained to only pursuing the best (or even good) outcomes, whatever definitions you care to use for "best" or "good". There also exist conditions of mortals' lives' "goodness" which may inherently conflict with maximal Shardic intervention. I maintain that it is only the assumption of complete benevolence and moral excellence that even potentially achieves the standards in the original question or that allow your second premise.

As an aside, @Schizoposting, have you ever read the Homecoming series by Card? The first three books, and especially the first, might be of interest to you if you like this topic. This is a pretty unsupported assumption. She wants to work with Taravangian-as-Odium, which is not the same as defeating it, though she did take out Rayse. Even if we were to agree that this is a meaningful piece of her moral calculus it doesn't follow that micromanaging Roshar would have accomplished it. Honor was directly and openly involved on Roshar, and explicitly had this as his goal, but failed and died in the process. "Be more hands on" is not a recipe for being more successful than Cultivation has so far been, and the struggle is not yet over. Additionally, this does nothing to respond to the possibility that Cultivation is not a consequentialist, an assumption it seems (to me) that you return to frequently but have yet to establish. My critique is not that the moral philosophy of the books is incomplete nor that it is internally inconsistent, it's that it's not there. Occasionally a question is raised, even more rarely discussed in the text, but most often the moral philosophy people claim are in the books (here on the Shard, at least) are things that they project into them. Situations with ethical dimensions are presented but virtually all specific ethical content and reasoning is left to the reader alone. That's not what I'm saying. We can absolutely assess whether or not we think that Cultivation's activities are the most ethical or appropriate or anything else, according to any definition or standard we care to introduce. What doesn't make sense is to judge a character's choices by a standard there is no reason to believe they hold as if they did hold that standard. It has nothing to do with postmodernism nor moral relativism. It also leaves the methods to the side, perhaps intentionally as I get the impression that you are a pretty strong consequentialist (from what I've read here that how it seems to me, I'm not trying to describe you to yourself). If methods do matter then how, precisely, is she to prevent war on Roshar? If not, do you perceive any differences between possible methods as long as they accomplish a nominal end? For example, slaughtering all Singers would have prevented future Desolations. Is that better, worse, or the same as those Desolations? If slaughtering the Singers avoided Desolations but expanded the scope and practice of inter-human wars, is that worse, and what solution then? We might also do well to describe what "direct intervention" really describes, as we know that there are restrictions on what Shards can and cannot do, at all or without consequences or risk, which will have strong consequences for what Shards can actually accomplish in these scenarios. 1. This is not the "moral standards of our society today". The United States this year specifically changed policy, claiming moral appropriateness, to pull food aid from Africa (and elsewhere). It has already led to increased deaths from starvation and will almost certainly continue to do so. There are people who feel that too few Americans are hungry or starving, people who are nominally Christians (so their moral philosophy makes this a dubious conclusion to reach). 2. Claiming common sense as a moral basis is a dodge, and usually not a skillful one. There are groups that are pro-genocide of specific other groups, and find it both common sense and logically appropriate to hold that position. 3. This does not address competing claims nor hard-to-value comparisons, as in my earlier example about lifespans and happiness or misery. 4. The description in your OP suggests a lot of values but doesn't establish them and relies on the Shard/dictator to keep them "good". It's fine, as far as it goes, to say that the goal is to create the "best possible society/civilization", but very unclear on what that actually is. It's not obvious to me that a Shard can fix sexism or racism, for example. Saying that the Shard will "fix wealth inequality" would be a lot more persuasive if the fix were detailed instead of asserted. It's unclear why it's better to develop technology and education when the Shard could directly provide food and any other necessities or appropriate desires-- wouldn't such provision be the most direct intervention possible? 5. What you have shared of the standards you describe still looks question-begging to me. It's still just "a unerring benevolent dictator with perfect knowledge, foresight, wisdom, and moral insight will directly intervene to the best degree to accomplish all the best things" because without details there is no distinction between "better than [x]" and "best" and no space for the dictator to be imperfect, wrong, or mistaken, or have anything ever be beyond their complete control. It's still just "the only things that matter are A, B, and C, and we are assuming that the Shard will completely satisfy A, B, and C with no side consequences". None of these are fixed by inserting some other random philosophy, be it Kantian deontology or Mills' utilitarianism or Nozick's libertarianism or Heidegger's ontology or classical Stoic corporealist rationalism or Freire's collaborative communitarianism. This reads to me as another dismissal of any ethical evaluations outside of the arbitrary ones you've submitted here. It also would seem to deny the denizens of the Cosmere any opportunity to participate in the social determination of ethics. In your treatment, ethics are something which happen to people who happen to live on a planet where a Shard feels like being in charge. They are examples of why Shards might eschew greater direct intervention than the levels that we see in the books. As best as I can tell, that is the core issue of your question: the goals are so obvious as to be incontestable, they are easily and directly accomplished by Shard-power beings via direct and constant intervention, and therefore any Shard who is not constantly directly intervening is failing, or at minimum worse than an imagined an a priori morally perfect absolute dictator would be. The examples I gave point at the second item: reasons why they may not behave as you suggest, even if they were to share your viewpoint. Preservation invested more of itself into Scadrial (well, Scadrians) and as a result was weaker than Ruin and, by extension, presumably weaker than all other Shards. Since we know that Shards have to worry about being attacked or subverted by other Shards, excessive investment will put at risk their ability to continue to dominate their planets and societies. If additional investment is required to meet your definition of direct intervention, a Shard may not be able directly intervene and also preserve the ability to keep intervening. For that matter, non-Shards can also interfere with Shards' efforts to control the world around them. Ruin's efforts to dominate Scadrial were ultimately not successful, so can any Shard's domination be assumed to be stable and enduring? Not all unintended consequences are equal, nor are they evenly distributed around actions, and unintended consequences are salient when we are discussing action vs. inaction. Threads like this tend to spread quite a lot, so let me try to re-consolidate: The OP asks if any specific set of goals (regardless of the underlying moral philosophies that establish or justify those goals) will be necessarily better achieved by a deific tyrant, who is asserted to be fully morally good, fully committed to those goals, and perfect in moral/ethical knowledge, than any arrangement which involves that deific tyrant exercising less direct control. I think I got the major elements of the question in there, but may have missed something. If that is accurate then the relevant questions seem to me to be: How fully can the tyrant control affairs on their planet or in their societies, and by what mechanisms? Which problems is the Shard charged with fixing, and how completely, and which are not the Shard's responsibility? How precisely can the tyrant guarantee specific outcomes? In cases of conflicting claims, do outcomes for individuals matter or are we only looking at an aggregate? Are there any aspects of existence which have moral relevance that conflict with being controlled to the extent that the Shard can effect? I still think that the OP defines most of these questions away, but organizing information like this helps me track where specific issues might be.

I think that this matchup is similar to the Kelsier-Kaladin fight, which per WoB Kelsier would win. I think that Vasher is likely to win for similar reasons as Kelsier. Both Kaladin and Vasher are excellent fighters, far above most people. But Vasher is more experienced by far, with centuries of practice and trial-by-fire fights for his life beyond what Kaladin has experienced. Vasher is also craftier, which helps him both come up with tricks to give him an edge against Kaladin and a better chance of understanding in real time any tricks Kaladin might come up with. Finally, I think we have a much better idea of the limits of Kaladin's Surgebinding powers than we do Vasher's ability to use Breaths. That means that I see more potential upside and unforeseen tactics from Vasher than from Kaladin. I see it being a brutal fight for both combatants, though.

The most direct answer to this is that Cultivation's moral viewpoint may not involve or allow direct control of the sort you describe. Another way of presenting that is that she is advancing her moral viewpoints to the maximum possible degree, and that her viewpoints are simply not the same as yours. She's doing the things that she believes achieve her values in ways she believes are acceptable. Unless I'm missing something your argument seems to be that because she's not achieving your values in ways that you believe are acceptable she must be holding back or failing in some way to accomplish her own values, and I don't see any reason to believe that that is the case. The Cosmere is shallow on moral philosophy because it doesn't do much to establish what is good or bad (and why), either collectively or for individual characters and situations. It reports that characters feel certain ways sometimes but generally does little to explain why those characters believe their conclusions to be correct or how they fit into broader ethical and philosophical systems. It then puts characters into direct conflict with mutually exclusive goals, creating winners and losers while also prompting readers to choose a "side" that they prefer from those limited options. We can absolutely talk about those things, even when the books do not, but that requires precision in what we discuss. We have to discuss what, specifically, is to be valued, and how we conceive of and measure it, what duties and obligations people have surrounding those values, and why we should value those things both in themselves and among each other. I disagree, though it is difficult to confidently claim that we know enough to evaluate Cultivation's activities versus her goals. A lot of her specific interventions worked well, up to and including eliminating Rayse, though fleeing Roshar afterwards is not a vote of confidence. We also don't know that the outcome is the worst one possible, in her estimation, even though I doubt that the way things ended up in WaT is her ideal situation. As I suggested above, she may not have a consequentialist view of morality at all (what evidence we have supports this at least as a possibility), in which case using the outcome to assess her behavior and activities is a category error. We also know very little about the details surrounding Shardic actions. Rayse intervened personally and directly all over the place, which ultimately led to him being in a position he did not want to be in and then dying. Cultivation preferring to avoid that situation is a possibility-- she may be operating under constraints we're not aware of. That it's a question of your ethical commitments is exactly my point. Blandly asserting a set of arbitrary ethical commitments and then asking why a totally different person isn't behaving accordingly, without establishing at all that the other person agrees with that set, doesn't make a lot of sense. If you are a hard materialist consequentialist I would expect you to operate very differently from a hardened idealist deontologist, and that should not be surprising (even if you find it surprising that the other person holds the views they do). The "moral standards of our society today" is neither clearly defined nor necessarily a standard that we can or should hold others (or ourselves) to even if it were. Trying to apply them as the only possible things a Shard could consider or value inherently asserts that other things are "disproven" as morally relevant. It's saying that Cultivation (for example) is failing because she does not act in accordance with your asserted value set A, and disregarding even the possibility that Cultivation might be working towards value set B. I may have missed it if you already did this, but it would help discussion if these moral standards to which you are appealing were clearly and precisely defined. The presumption that Shardic intervention is inherently for a morally good purpose is the thing that creates this conflict: there isn't any reason to believe that Cultivation (or any of the Shards) isn't (or aren't) already maximally doing this in accordance with their own philosophies, subject to any errors they might make in judging what actions best accomplish what they think is best. It's only in not prioritizing things the same way that you do that any potential conflicts arise-- for example, a consequentialist-aspected goal of "eliminating hunger" might be accomplished by creating sufficient food, or alternatively by killing enough people that existing food becomes sufficient for the survivors. Assuming inherently good moral purposes to any intervention would leave these morally indistinguishable from each other even if we soften the consequentialism. I'm still not seeing the space in the setup for discussion to really happen, it seems that everything except the conclusion you started with is defined out. Unless I'm misunderstanding, which is uncomfortably common. If we're only talking about efficacy there are a few possibilities that the text suggests to me. There is danger in direct involvement, both in tying a Shard more powerfully to a planet and investing so much of their powers and natures that it leaves them vulnerable to hazards, such as hostile Shards. There are some results of direct intervention which may be counterproductive to other things the Shard values, such as Sazed's concern about having made life in the Elendel Basin too easy for the people that live there. Unintended consequences (or disfavored sets of consequences) seem unavoidable at Shard-level scope, so tightly accomplishing specific goals might not even be realistic in the general case. Even within this we still need to define what goals the Shards have before we can do much to assess their efficacy and means in pursuing those goals.

I'm not sure I understand your question to me about Cultivation. If I'm off-target please let me know. As above, the books are too shallow for us to confidently answer these questions. My read on Cultivation is that she does intervene frequently (if indirectly) but doesn't care as much about end states as she does about things developing generally ("all things must be cultivated, even the thorns"). She's not inactive, and also influences the Nightwatcher (who intervenes frequently and directly). Her interventions (direct or by allowing the Nightwatcher's decisions to stand) with individuals seeking the Old Magic have radically shaped Roshar. Certainly that's the case through Taravangian, Lift, and Dalinar. She may also value things like freedom of choice and/or freedom from control, or the importance of sapient beings self-organizing. She may feel that there are risks involved in that type or degree of control, as from other Shards or some downsides to Shardic domination that we aren't aware of. Maybe she's just maximally self-centered and cares primarily about how much effort she has to exert, preferring not to directly micromanage everything to this degree. Most people imagine themselves to be morally good, an assessment that I think people are generally are far too casual about; maybe Cultivation believes there is a chance of error in her moral determinations and is reticent as a result. I do not presume that I am morally infallible and so do not assume that my assessments, decisions, and actions are always morally good or even acceptable. This would not change if I suddenly gained Shardic power somehow, it would only magnify my reach and influence, for good or ill. I don't think that Cultivation is particularly interested in the day-to-day circumstances of people nor the ends towards which they develop, and so this kind of direct control is not interesting nor meaningful to her. People tend to think that anything they do is morally permissible to do, and with Shardic power the most likely answer to your question is that Cultivation is already doing the things she thinks are best (from an amoral perspective) and are also morally permissible (not necessarily ideal). So, she is directly intervening but is not into total domination for whatever reason. Her moral philosophy may simply preclude domination, or favor other approaches. "The alternative" is also undefined, unless you are asserting "the best available", which seems to be the case. "Is the best the best?" is a pointless question, except as far as it encourages people to define what "the best" entails and why. If we're comparing body counts and nothing else comparisons are often easy: 1,000,000 dead is worse than 900,000 dead. Unless of course those people are people that the actor's values dictate should be dead, in which case the larger number is better. Comparing 100 dead with 100,000 people in grinding poverty might be harder (again, depending on the framework you use to evaluate). It's not obvious how to compare 100,000 people who live for 60 years each and are happy throughout against 100,000 people who live 100 years each but are utterly miserable and despairing for 40 of those years (or 50, or 60, or all of them). "Better than the worst" does not necessarily mean "good". In limiting the historical alternative case to deaths from war, famine, and disease as things which, if fixed (however we define "fixed" for them) are acceptable for a permanent Shardic dictator then you've expressed what things you value (or value most) in making these decisions. I doubt that that is a full view: would you accept as good a Shardic dictator who brutally enslaves all the people on their planet, in the manner of all skaa under the Lord Ruler, as long as none of them die to war, hunger, or disease?

The Cosmere books are too shallow on philosophy and ethics for there to be a really good, in-universe answer to questions like this. Taravangian could be right, if you assume a bunch of other things into the question including the goals held by the Shard, their inherent rightness, and certain relationships between the Shard and the people they dominate. Assuming a benevolent, all-powerful, all-knowing, eternal being who (and this is key) holds exactly the values you think they should hold and no others, obviates the question. The question as stated is underdefined, having nothing established for means, ends, nor ways to evaluate either. "Would having a perfectly good being, who makes all the best choices for the best reasons, doing all the best things be better than any alternative?" is a good question for examining the means, ends, and evaluations thereof but I don't think that it can lead to a conclusion like "Taravangian is right (or wrong)" by itself. In the spirit of the question, I would say that Taravangian is not right. It's a very high-stakes decision to put one being in charge of everything, especially without a framework to evaluate what we think that one being would do (and why, if that's a relevant item of your moral assessment). Even if it conceivably could work in an ideal way, the risk that it would work out in any way other than that seems high (especially without the ability to change things after the Shardictator is installed).

They can walk along ceilings and up walls, though mostly limited to large buildings. They can have great mobility by pulling to adjust their course while moving (anchors permitting, of course). They can frustrate metal projectiles and certainly don't need to maximally pull on everything indefinitely-- you can divert a flying knife from its target by pulsing your iron, and since it would obviously be foolish to pull it into your own chest the lurcher just... wouldn't do that. The ability to see iron lines could be handy in a variety of situations. Snatching metal objects towards yourself and away from others could be very useful-- the key to your cell or handcuffs, a weapon that an enemy is closer to than you are, pulling a weapon out of an adversary's hands or ruining their aim or balance. A lot of modern equipment contains small masses of metal and can be ruined if that metal is torn from its normal place. A really good lurcher (as in, better than any we've seen) could pick locks very easily.

Tons! On-demand superior balance, poise, strength, resilience, and healing are all pretty nice, especially when they're non-obvious and have low collateral impact (if I slip on some stairs and burn pewter I'm fine, but if I summon Plate I'm going to be uninjured but also demolish those stairs). I'd be able to move quickly, on the ground or through the air, without destroying the streets/walls/roofs around me to do so. Pewter lets you sprint for longer than Plate will, and also lets you deal with inadequate sleep (if you have to, I wouldn't endorse Vin's mode of use). If I were injured in any way, pewter helps a lot to recover. Sharper senses are handy in a wide variety of situations. If I wanted or needed to sneak around somewhere, or even just not draw attention while doing something, Allomancy offers options while Plate is... less helpful. If I wanted to maintain a "secret identity", or at least not have lots of people know about my super-powered Christmas gift any time I want to use it, Plate presents some difficulties. Iron and steel would be really helpful, or at least convenient, in a lot of tasks, if not critically useful very often. The mobility alone is nice, and is three dimensional. Zinc and brass could certainly be used in unethical ways (and very easily), but I don't think that their use is inherently unethical. And, importantly, the Allomancy seems a lot more flexible not just in in the spread of powers it offers but the ability to combine and control the intensity or specific effect they have. Creativity and imagination seem like they expand Allomancy more than Unoathed gear to me, though maybe I'm just not being creative nor imaginative enough about the Plate. Living Plate has a lot of potential as well (powered armor that can change shape to suit your needs? Amazing!), but summoning the Plate is an all-or-nothing proposition. I agree with you that permanent loss of Breaths isn't an especially acute problem, just a risk that the other powers don't have. Especially if you imagine doing superhero-like activities the risk of damage or loss seems like it would increase. If your interest in the Breaths is something that doesn't Invest them in other objects, such as to store memories, then the power looks a lot more valuable-- it costs nothing (as far as we know), risks little, and none of the other powers can imitate it. The point of the thresholds is that you lose something, which is the use-of-one-Breath example was meant to highlight, though I'll agree that the first four Heightenings don't suggest such an intense loss from dropping below a given value. The marginal loss view makes the Investment of Breaths even more of an issue because it always costs you something from the passive powers to do any Awakening (no "freebies" between thresholds). More information on the scale of Breaths Awakeners have to use would really help, but I can easily imagine a couple of Awakenings at once using hundreds of Breaths and making the marginal cost much higher than the one-Breath example suggest. Whether or not that loss is a big deal to you is a personal preference around how much you like having the passive powers. I wouldn't turn my nose up at the Breaths, much like the Unoathed gear. But my ordered preference includes this aspect of the Breaths as well, which may not impact others' preferences as much.