Philosophy

[Silverblade5]

Due to the fact that the random stuff thread always grows at least four pages whenever there's a philosophical discussion, I am moving it all here!

[Orlion Blight]

You can't cage me!

[Observer]

So, what philosophy should we discuss? Kant and the Deontologists? How about Utilitarianism? Or, because I haven't been near the parent thread, you meant an entirely different type of philosophy and I'm gonna feel stupid soon.

[Silverblade5]

So, what philosophy should we discuss? Kant and the Deontologists? How about Utilitarianism? Or, because I haven't been near the parent thread, you meant an entirely different type of philosophy and I'm gonna feel stupid soon.

Discussion started here.

[Kasimir]

So, what philosophy should we discuss? Kant and the Deontologists? How about Utilitarianism? Or, because I haven't been near the parent thread, you meant an entirely different type of philosophy and I'm gonna feel stupid soon.

Is there a reason why philosophy is always Kant or utilitarianism, or, to put it bluntly, ethics?

 

I've said it before and I'll say it again: it is extremely frustrating for one's subject area to be boiled down to nothing more than ethics. I can deal with the fact that internet discussions don't really do well at philosophical depth or rigour. I can deal with the fact that many people misrepresent the nuances of positions that are really more clever than they think they are.

 

But is there some reason we should always be nothing more than ethicists?

 

[STINK]

The whole area of Philosophy would probably be harder to talk about than Ethics, as well as Ethics being an area that more people may feel they can speak up in, as they might have personal experiences with the discussion.

[Kasimir]

The whole area of Philosophy would probably be harder to talk about than Ethics, as well as Ethics being an area that more people may feel they can speak up in, as they might have personal experiences with the discussion.

It reminds me of an interesting discussion between a historian and a physicist that I overheard. Physicist said, "I think I'll do some history once I retire." Historian retorted, "Well, I've always wanted to be a physicist."

Physicist misses the point. As, I suspect, does everyone else.

[Young Bard]

Okay. Morzathoth seems to have had a very one sided battle with just about everybody else in Random Stuff, and I think I actually agree with what he says, I'd just like to phrase it differently, because I don't think they completely understood his argument the way he put it.

 

Here's the way I see it. There are things that are. These are things that physically must exist in the universe. The laws of physics fall into this category. They can not be changed, they can not be altered, they can not be broken. They are there, they always have been there, and they always will be there.

 

Then there are things that can be created and changed. This is what morality is. To say morality does not exist would be wrong. It clearly does. To say morality exists as an absolute, however, is incorrect. It is a human construct. There is no definitive answer to it, and it is subject to change.

 

A recent example on this is homosexual rights. 30 years ago, homosexuals were considered horrible people, and many people were frankly disgusted by the thought of homosexuality as a concept. However, most people nowadays are now okay with it. Why? Morality changes.

 

The same is true even of extremes. Murder in cold blood. Of course, such a thing is indefensible, and no one claims otherwise. But, it is morally wrong because humans have made it morally wrong. So, therefore, before humans existed, before life existed, how could there have been laws and regulations on what is 'right' and 'wrong' about that life?

 

Now we get into the less clear cut stuff. Wants and needs. If someone wants something, should they then get it, whatever the cost.

 

At risk of turning philosophy into mathematics, I'll say this. If the need is greater than the pain/damage caused, then it is acceptable (by my standards). So really, it comes down to this. What is (insert need) worth, and what is (death/pain/suffering/damage/etc) worth?

 

That's the catch. Capitalists like to think that money is a lot more valuable than I do. Am I (and other non-capitalists) right? Or is it them? This is where we start getting to the point where it's really impossible for anybody to say truthfully. Because, no matter how hard people try, they can't actually gauge those needs accurately without incorporating personal bias.

 

So, any questions? Want to shoot down anything I've said? Feel free! I'll be more than happy to see what people say.

[Kasimir]

Here's the way I see it. There are things that are. These are things that physically must exist in the universe. The laws of physics fall into this category. They can not be changed, they can not be altered, they can not be broken. They are there, they always have been there, and they always will be there.

 

Then there are things that can be created and changed. This is what morality is. To say morality does not exist would be wrong. It clearly does. To say morality exists as an absolute, however, is incorrect. It is a human construct. There is no definitive answer to it, and it is subject to change.

 

A recent example on this is homosexual rights. 30 years ago, homosexuals were considered horrible people, and many people were frankly disgusted by the thought of homosexuality as a concept. However, most people nowadays are now okay with it. Why? Morality changes.

Conflation of opinion and morality. Your implicit assumption is that the people of 30 years ago were 'correct' (insofar as we can use that term, on your view), to consider homosexuality to be morally degenerate. This is not an assumption you have justified or defended, and hence is not an assumption you are entitled to make. In particular, this is the is-ought gap, also referred to as Hume's fork or the naturalistic fallacy:

Just because something is (or has been) the case does not mean we can immediately slip into an 'ought' claim, much less a claim that 'ought' claims do not exist. To do so requires further argumentative work, which you have not supplied.

One could easily reverse your argument against you: two centuries ago, people believed miasma caused diseases. Today, we do not. Even better, we could be completely wrong about the germ theory of disease: look at how science keeps changing what we thought we knew. (Case in point: the radical shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics.) There is no definite scientific answer and it is subject to change.

 

The same is true even of extremes. Murder in cold blood. Of course, such a thing is indefensible, and no one claims otherwise. But, it is morally wrong because humans have made it morally wrong. So, therefore, before humans existed, before life existed, how could there have been laws and regulations on what is 'right' and 'wrong' about that life?

Conflation between non-naturalism and subjectivism. The ontological nature of moral facts has nothing to do with their epistemic status.

[Blaze1616]

...

 

I think you've missed his point. Considering his argument is that morality is a human construct, all he's done is provide an example of a change in the masses's moral code. To take it a step farther, he could have used slavery, rather than homosexuality. Far more documented, and far easier to provide historical records proving that, historically, slavery was seen as moral, and now is not. Unless an opponent can prove that the rejection of slavery (or the acceptance of homosexuality) was not a result of a shift in morals, I don't see your point in dismissing the argument.

[Kasimir]

I think you've missed his point. Considering his argument is that morality is a human construct, all he's done is provide an example of a change in the masses's moral code. To take it a step farther, he could have used slavery, rather than homosexuality. Far more documented, and far easier to provide historical records proving that, historically, slavery was seen as moral, and now is not. Unless an opponent can prove that the rejection of slavery (or the acceptance of homosexuality) was not a result of a shift in morals, I don't see your point in dismissing the argument.

Just as you are missing mine. My point is that philosophically, we are not entitled to draw the distinction between what is perceived as moral and what *is* moral. That is to say, we can use the word 'moral' in a descriptive way and in a normative way. To claim that people used to believe Moral Claim X (an is-claim) is one thing. It is to make a descriptive claim saying that people used to believe X and used to use it to regulate action. To suggest that it is a normative claim because people used to believe it is a different claim entirely. You cannot ground a claim of normativity on a descriptive claim.

Your failure to make that distinction makes you miss my point as well. Your claim that it was the result of a shift in morals is a descriptive, historical claim. You'll notice that there is a gap between claiming that norms shifted and that 'those norms were just as correct as our current norms' (normative claim.) And Bard's entire argument is predicated on collapsing the is-ought distinction. It is predicated on claiming that because something historically was the case and guided action, we ought to treat it as a moral claim in every sense of the word moral, beyond just 'reason-guiding', to actually assuming justificatory status.

 

We are not entitled to do that.

[Zathoth]

I feel like I should write some clarifications to what I meant, but then I'll just be dragged into another discussion and I dont want to do that right now.

 

Also, good idea to make a philosophy thread, then I can stop clogging the random stuff.

[Orlion Blight]

Won't stop me! I may just clog it with excerpts of the John Rawls book I'm reading now! Mwahaha!

Incidentally, Kasmir, it does appear that Rawls is much more concerned with just societies, with much less focus on individual morality leading me to believe that you were correct in saying the Veil of Ignorance is misapplied when determining if one's individual action is moral.

[Observer]

@Kasimir (Is the quote button broken? I've been gone too long to know these things)

Aaaaand I love how I just walked straight into my own pet peeve without noticing it. Yeah, I'm often annoyed by that too, it just happened that I'd had a really huge conversation with a friend about the merits of Consequentialism right before posting, and opened with that. Sweet, delicious irony.

 

It sounds like we're kind of dancing around moral/cultural relativism principles at the moment, and all the fun things that come with it. First one to bend or break Godwin's Law loses

Edited November 19, 2015 by Observer

[Blaze1616]

 

Just as you are missing mine. My point is that philosophically, we are not entitled to draw the distinction between what is perceived as moral and what *is* moral. That is to say, we can use the word 'moral' in a descriptive way and in a normative way. To claim that people used to believe Moral Claim X (an is-claim) is one thing. It is to make a descriptive claim saying that people used to believe X and used to use it to regulate action. To suggest that it is a normative claim because people used to believe it is a different claim entirely. You cannot ground a claim of normativity on a descriptive claim.

Your failure to make that distinction makes you miss my point as well. Your claim that it was the result of a shift in morals is a descriptive, historical claim. You'll notice that there is a gap between claiming that norms shifted and that 'those norms were just as correct as our current norms' (normative claim.) And Bard's entire argument is predicated on collapsing the is-ought distinction. It is predicated on claiming that because something historically was the case and guided action, we ought to treat it as a moral claim in every sense of the word moral, beyond just 'reason-guiding', to actually assuming justificatory status.

 

We are not entitled to do that.

 

So you're suggesting that he must prove people found slavery to be perfectly moral, otherwise the example is invalid? I am confused, because I am failing to see the normative claim you're referencing. Whether or not I believe the people of the past to be correct in their moral decisions does not change the fact that their morals were what they were. Nor does it change the fact that the masses's change in views regarding slavery is an example of the moral code shifting and changing through time, and as such is a human creation.

 

Now, I'm no philosopher, but looking into the is-ought fallacy that you've brought up, I'm failing to see how that applies. I'm not suggesting that because slavery used to be viewed as moral, we ought to believe it is or isn't moral. It's merely an example to the argument that morality is a human construct, and not some unchangeable absolute in the universe. Perhaps I'm misunderstanding the is-ought fallacy, and if so further explanation would be appreciated.

[Seonid]

 

 

 

So you're suggesting that he must prove people found slavery to be perfectly moral, otherwise the example is invalid? I am confused, because I am failing to see the normative claim you're referencing. Whether or not I believe the people of the past to be correct in their moral decisions does not change the fact that their morals were what they were. Nor does it change the fact that the masses's change in views regarding slavery is an example of the moral code shifting and changing through time, and as such is a human creation.

 

Now, I'm no philosopher, but looking into the is-ought fallacy that you've brought up, I'm failing to see how that applies. I'm not suggesting that because slavery used to be viewed as moral, we ought to believe it is or isn't moral. It's merely an example to the argument that morality is a human construct, and not some unchangeable absolute in the universe. Perhaps I'm misunderstanding the is-ought fallacy, and if so further explanation would be appreciated.

 

 

The point Kas is trying to make is this:

 

You are taking a historical fact - that attitudes about homosexuality or slavery have changed because of a change in human beliefs about the morality of homosexual acts or slavery - and trying to use it to support a metaphysical claim - that all morality is socially constructed, and that changing the beliefs of a population actually changes what is moral or not.

 

Kas's counterargument is this: your argument is not a valid one. That is, regardless of whether the conclusion is correct or not, the argument you have used to get there is flawed. In particular, his claim is that you cannot use the example of shifting human beliefs about what is moral to demonstrate that what actually is moral has changed. That is, you are arguing that what is moral has changed, but all you can demonstrate from history is that what people believe has changed. You need more argument than you have given to demonstrate that there is an actual connection between what people believe and what is.

 

(For clarity, I don't think that he is actually getting into the argument on whether you are correct or not, just pointing out that your argument doesn't demonstrate what you are trying to demonstrate.)

[Blaze1616]

...

 

Thank you for the explanation, that really helps. But now we're at an impasse, because I'm trying to prove that morality isn't set in stone, but you're suggesting that my argument is flawed because I haven't provided a set in stone definition of morality. 

[Young Bard]

First one to bend or break Godwin's Law loses

 

Don't be silly. Only Hitler would do that.

 

 

The point Kas is trying to make is this:

 

You are taking a historical fact - that attitudes about homosexuality or slavery have changed because of a change in human beliefs about the morality of homosexual acts or slavery - and trying to use it to support a metaphysical claim - that all morality is socially constructed, and that changing the beliefs of a population actually changes what is moral or not.

 

Kas's counterargument is this: your argument is not a valid one. That is, regardless of whether the conclusion is correct or not, the argument you have used to get there is flawed. In particular, his claim is that you cannot use the example of shifting human beliefs about what is moral to demonstrate that what actually is moral has changed. That is, you are arguing that what is moral has changed, but all you can demonstrate from history is that what people believe has changed. You need more argument than you have given to demonstrate that there is an actual connection between what people believe and what is.

 

(For clarity, I don't think that he is actually getting into the argument on whether you are correct or not, just pointing out that your argument doesn't demonstrate what you are trying to demonstrate.)

 

I'm agreeing with Blaze here. I'll even take it further.

 

Using Seonid's explanation, then you seem to be saying that just because something was considered to be moral/ immoral at the time, that does not necessarily make it moral/ immoral. In which case, one could argue that the same is true of present day 'morals', which might not accurately reflect so called 'true' morals. This would mean that any explanation / definition of morality that could possibly be given is automatically invalid, because it is only based on the current social interpretation, and not the 'actual' morality.

 

In which case, how is one expected to have any discussion about 'morality' at all?

 

(If I've completely misunderstood your argument, please clarify.)

[Seonid]

The following should be taken with a grain of salt - I am not a philosopher, neither do I have special training there. I have a double major in Physics and Religious Studies - which gives me exactly zero qualifications (If you want a philosopher, Kasimir is actually finishing his Honour's thesis in philosophy - I'd pay attention to his arguments). However, I have tried to understand the thought process of philosophers, which is why I'm here (that and because I had a conversation with Kasimir earlier where we talked about this same sort of stuff - so it was on my mind when I read this thread).

 

End disclaimer.

 

You're getting closer, I think, Blaze. But I'm not saying your argument is flawed because you haven't provided a set in stone definition. I'm saying that the argument is flawed because you're trying to use history to demonstrate it. Now, if your argument was that moral beliefs are not set in stone, then history would be more than sufficient to prove that.

 

As an example, let us use the following thought experiment. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that there is a universal moral truth - that slavery is wrong. Then we look at history. For a long time, people believe that slavery is right. Then, most of them start believing slavery is wrong.

 

Now, let us assume for the sake of argument that there are no universal moral truths - that morality is not set in stone (and maybe doesn't even exist). Let's look at history again. For a long time, people believe that slavery is right. Then, most of them start believing slavery is wrong.

 

Just from looking at history, we can't tell the difference between the two cases. We have to use a different form of argument. (I offer one outline below).

 

 

TheYoungBard, there are two basic positions here - one that says "There is no such thing as a universal moral truth, external to human society" and another that says "There is such a thing as a universal moral truth, that would exist even if humans didn't." By my understanding, you argue for the first. Tell me if I have gotten your argument wrong:

 

1 - Historically, a group of humans once believed that X was wrong.

2 - Now, the descendants of that group believe that X is right.

3 - This demonstrates that "right" and "wrong" are completely constructed by human society, and that there is no universal, non-human constructed moral truth.

 

What I am saying is that 2 does not imply 3. 3 may or may not be true, but 2 doesn't imply it. Basically, the historical or present fact of a belief's existence can tell us exactly nothing about whether or not that moral belief matches up with "real morality," or even if there is a such a thing as "real morality." We have to use an entirely different set of arguments.

 

Basically, you can't use historical claims to justify metaphysical claims. If you want to justify the metaphysical claim, you must start from metaphysics. Start from logical first principles. Talk about the nature of things. Then use those arguments about the nature of things and their properties to claim that there is no such thing as a moral property - that there is no such thing as "rightness" or "wrongness." There are philosophers who do that - it's not a weak view. But arguing history can't get you to there.

 

Of course, there are philosophers who argue the other way, too - that there is a such thing as moral "rightness" or "wrongness" - that these are real properties an action may have. And then they get into ways of determining whether such an action is "right" or "wrong." These are not weak arguments either. But you can't get to them by arguing history either.

 

These are, of course, not ethical arguments - they are meta-ethical (and the Wikipedia article on meta-ethics is a reasonable place to start research into this subject - also, having a conversation with Kasimir helps too).

Edited November 20, 2015 by Seonid

[Kasimir]

The following should be taken with a grain of salt - I am not a philosopher, neither do I have special training there. I have a double major in Physics and Religious Studies - which gives me exactly zero qualifications (If you want a philosopher, Kasimir is actually finishing his Master's thesis in philosophy - I'd pay attention to his arguments). However, I have tried to understand the thought process of philosophers, which is why I'm here (that and because I had a conversation with Kasimir earlier where we talked about this same sort of stuff - so it was on my mind when I read this thread).

 

End disclaimer.

Please edit that disclaimer, Seonid I'm finishing my Honours thesis in philosophy and applying for a Master's programme.

 

Using Seonid's explanation, then you seem to be saying that just because something was considered to be moral/ immoral at the time, that does not necessarily make it moral/ immoral. In which case, one could argue that the same is true of present day 'morals', which might not accurately reflect so called 'true' morals. This would mean that any explanation / definition of morality that could possibly be given is automatically invalid, because it is only based on the current social interpretation, and not the 'actual' morality.

 

In which case, how is one expected to have any discussion about 'morality' at all?

 

(If I've completely misunderstood your argument, please clarify.)

Okay. Look. You can't ground a claim about what morality is in a claim about what kinds of action-guiding norms that people follow. This does not entail that no notion of morality works. How do we ground a decent understanding of morality? Well, for one, a non-subjectivist/non-error theorist might appeal, as Michael Huemer does, to intuition and to phenomenal impressions. By arguing for parity between mathematics and morality, on Huemer's account, morality is pretty much nothing more than intuition reaching out and grasping the moral facts, the same way you intuit mathematical facts. Huemer does not commit the is-ought fallacy. This does not entail that his argument is unassailable. My professor thinks that Huemer's argument is really flaky, and so do I. But what's worth noting is that like in most meta-ethical positions, he is attempting to find justification for morality in reason (or in other sources, really.)

Or you could go, as many hedonic utilitarians do, and ground morality on the intrinsic goodness of pleasure, because if there's any reliable source of knowledge, it is phenomenal impressions (as opposed to sense impressions). (But beware: I am not entirely convinced that this argument evades an is-ought issue.)

It's not to say that the 'current social interpretation' doesn't have any value in ethical discussion [it does in the form of intuitions, but even the use of intuitions is now meta-ethically contestable, and I, at least, am wary of resorting to them], but that we need to be circumspect about appeal to it. I don't understand why you in fact wish to privilege any description of current social morals, because they don't have all that much currency. Saying that past social interpretations are bunk and using that to anchor a larger condemnation of morality is more or less going for the low-hanging fruit.

[Seonid]

Please edit that disclaimer, Seonid I'm finishing my Honours thesis in philosophy and applying for a Master's programme.

 

Edited

[Blaze1616]

Thanks for the help, Seonid and Kasimir. I really appreciate the patience. I'm not qualified, nor prepared, to make the appropriate arguments, though, so I suppose the discussion ends here, for me anyways. Thanks again!

[Orlion Blight]

Slowly, but surely, I'm making my way through my Rawls book. It is interesting stuff, and I'll formulate some quandaries here after a bit.

I'm doing it here instead of Random Stuff not because it's appropriate, but because I'm more likely to get a response.

[Kasimir]

Slowly, but surely, I'm making my way through my Rawls book. It is interesting stuff, and I'll formulate some quandaries here after a bit.

I'm doing it here instead of Random Stuff not because it's appropriate, but because I'm more likely to get a response.

A Theory of Justice, or one of his later works?

[Orlion Blight]

A Theory of Justice, or one of his later works?

The Law of Peoples, which references A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism quite a bit. I've been able to find Political Liberalism at a Half Price Books and am trying to get A theory of Justice for my birthday/Christmas.

When talking about the Veil of Ignorance, he describes it being "thick" meaning you do not consider "comprehensive doctrine" when formulating the original position. So for example, you would not use, say, "Christian values" to guide you in making just laws in a "reasonably liberal democratic constitutional regime" to preserve what we might call First amendment rights for simplicity sake (He uses the term "reasonable pluralism")

So my question is would one also ignore societal makeup of comprehensive doctrine while behind the Veil of Ignorance? Would you not consider that a population was twenty percent Hindu, twelve percent Muslim, fifty percent Christian, eight percent Jewish and ten percent other?

I think I'm leaning towards it not being necessary, since the preservation of reasonable pluralism should cover any concern one might have in preserving culture or religious identity.