Ripheus23

It occurred to me that:

• If corruption is the negation of good predicates, and not the addition of evil predicates, then even corruption can be "reduced to" a destruction-like process, in which case Apollyon alone can represent the Form of Evil, it seems. Maybe.
• Also, in assertoric propositional logic, {X is ~true} = ~{X is true}. That is, contradictory negation collapses into contrary negation, and vice versa, so to say. This does not happen in term/predicate logic, to my knowledge. Anyway, there is a different application of the axiom of opposition, therefore, when it comes to honesty and mendacity, namely, an act can be the physical opposite of a true assertion (e.g. assassinating a whistleblower) or the logicwise-opposite, as in a lie. So the Form of Evil, in lying, is not reductively identical to physical opposition as such (maybe this contradicts(!) the Apollyon-as-the-FOE idea!).
• But also anyway, then, the morality of lying vs. truth-telling can be mapped onto the priority of the concepts of right and evil. I.e. since truth is more strongly correlated with right, and since the true and the right are conceptually prior to the false and the evil, action expressive of the truth carries with it a prima facie or as they sometimes say pro tanto justification.