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Anniversary Game 9/Anonymous Game 13: Rebuilding Tyrian Falls


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1 minute ago, Salmon Meerkat said:

My suggestion is to try counterfactuals and then when the GMs @ you, direct them to my grand-supervisor Alan Hajek's persuasive paper about how most ordinary counterfactuals in fact evaluate as false, therefore everything you say is a lie.

If counterfactual statements were in fact true, then I would sometimes use them >:P.

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Just now, Charcoal Hyena said:

If counterfactual statements were in fact true, then I would sometimes use them >:P.

It is both false that if counterfactual statements were in fact true, then you would sometimes use them, and that if counterfactual statements were in fact false, you would sometimes not use them. It is also false that if counterfactuals were in fact true, then you would sometimes not use them >:P

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Thank goodness it's over. I need to read this thing to find out what the heck was going on. I am so confused. 

Toucan was an elim?
WHAT THE HECK?????????
I am shook. I thought for sure there was no way that was an elim ploy. 
I need to go rethink my life. 
Edit: you know, there was a point in this game where I thought I knew what was going on. And then I died, and then suddenly I had no idea what was going on. Sometimes I wonder what the point of all this is. 

Edited by Indigo Weasel
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4 minutes ago, Salmon Meerkat said:

It is both false that if counterfactual statements were in fact true, then you would sometimes use them, and that if counterfactual statements were in fact false, you would sometimes not use them. It is also false that if counterfactuals were in fact true, then you would sometimes not use them >:P

Sir are you sure? >:P

If counterfactuals were in fact true, then you are saying that both I wouldn't sometimes use them and I wouldn't sometimes not use them. In other words, it seems that in this hypothetical world I would use both use counterfactuals all of the time and use counterfactuals none of the time. If this was what you were implying, this would be an obvious contradiction.

It comes down to whether you took my antecedent to imply that counterfactuals people use are generally true, or took it to the extreme that counterfactuals are all true without exception. In the former case, even if you don't believe that counterfactuals are generally true, and thus that the nearest reality to our own in which counterfactuals were generally true is not in fact the reality we live in, it is unlikely that this reality is one in which logical contradictions are permitted, as that would very likely constitute a much more dramatic departure from our current reality than is strictly necessary to make counterfactuals become generally true. In the latter case, in any hypothetical world where all counterfactuals are true, it is likely necessary that brazen logical contradictions are permitted, so in that case feel free to carry on, I suppose.

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2 hours ago, Charcoal Hyena said:

If counterfactuals were in fact true, then you are saying that both I wouldn't sometimes use them and I wouldn't sometimes not use them. In other words, it seems that in this hypothetical world I would use both use counterfactuals all of the time and use counterfactuals none of the time. If this was what you were implying, this would be an obvious contradiction.

Actually, no, because your statement implies the law of noncontradiction applies straightforwardly to conditionals and we know it doesn't. In other words: it only works if we assert that counterfactual A and counterfactual B are negations of each other, but just because the consequents are opposed doesn't imply the counterfactual itself is

Or to put it another way:

One can't, unless one is Graham Priest and endorses one of multiple paraconsistent logic systems, assert that P and not-P at the same time. (Note that even Priest is not committed to the claim that it is always the case that P and not-P, only that it is sometimes the case that P and not-P.)

However: it is also not the case that if A, then P, and if A, then not-P actually translate into logical contradictions of each other. (Part of this has to do with the truth table.) Conditionals don't evaluate the same way as naked statements. Some of this boils down to arguments about whether hook is the correct translation of the conditional or not. 

2 hours ago, Charcoal Hyena said:

It comes down to whether you took my antecedent to imply that counterfactuals people use are generally true, or took it to the extreme that counterfactuals are all true without exception. In the former case, even if you don't believe that counterfactuals are generally true, and thus that the nearest reality to our own in which counterfactuals were generally true is not in fact the reality we live in, it is unlikely that this reality is one in which logical contradictions are permitted, as that would very likely constitute a much more dramatic departure from our current reality than is strictly necessary to make counterfactuals become generally true. In the latter case, in any hypothetical world where all counterfactuals are true, it is likely necessary that brazen logical contradictions are permitted, so in that case feel free to carry on, I suppose.

See above. This rests on a contentious translation that contradictory consequents are actually contradictory simpliciter. I also point out that this doesn't work well with multi-value logics and paraconsistent systems. In fact, given you are evaluating counterfactuals by modal logic, you're already looking at a selection of systems, some of which are silent about contradictions.

Edited to add:

image.png

Here's the truth table for S⊃P and S⊃~P (can't really use proper not notation here.) The combined truth table is highlighted in blue. If they were really contradictions, the truth table values we should see is F-F-F-F: contradictions formally defined evaluate as false under all possible truth values in the table. Compare to:

image.png

The takeaway lesson is:

1. Conditionals are weird

2. Some of the issue probably boils down to hook translation. But if not material conditional, then what do we use?

3. Conditionals are actually cool

4. "Even the crows on the roof-tops are cawing about which conditionals are true." - Callimachus. The Greeks hated this too! :P

5. You can probably argue for a separate semantic evaluation of counterfactuals as a particular subspecies of conditionals which is what Hajek is doing but it's worth noting that if you do want to bring in the law of non-contradiction, then it basically has Problems.

Disclaimer: This used to be my life and made me happy :( 

Edited to add 2:

Now you could argue the implication of Hajek is that since most ordinary counterfactuals are false, we wind up with a contradiction. But really that's a narrow read of the situation because this means pretty much every ordinary counterfactual turns up with a false truth value by default: it doesn't matter whether it's S⊃A, S⊃B, S⊃C, S⊃P, S⊃~P.

Like, the really stunning impact of an evaluation of most ordinary counterfactuals as false isn't about the Law of Non-Contradiction, it's really about the fact that statements we ordinarily take to have some form of truth value, e.g.

"If Orlok had remembered to sign up for the AG, he would have voted Cham" or "If I were Village, you would have MLed me for not claiming," all come out as just blatantly false. But it's clear the utterer doesn't in fact believe they are uttering a falsehood. It's less an issue of contradiction and a worrying one about vacuousness.

Edited to add 3:

To be honest, the reason I think evaluating counterfactuals is really interesting is that standard conditional analysis automatically implies they are all true if you don't go modal. (Again, if you translate conditionals via hook, then any false antecedent commits you to the conditional evaluating as true. But that creates a separate set of problems - intuitively, it's just as odd to say "If Orlok had remembered to sign up for the AG, he would have voted Cham" and "If Orlok had remembered to sign up for the AG, he would not have voted Cham." are both truth statements. The appeal of Hajek's approach is that he takes up the intuitive approach which is that okay, maybe the problem is we don't evaluate the antecedent against the actual world - let's use modal logic/possible world semantics. And then that's when things get Complicated.)

Edited to add 4:

For anyone who finds this deeply fascinating/feels passionate about conditionals, you can check out Jonathan Bennett's 'A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.' Some of Bennett's evaluations are fairly contentious and he takes sides more than some authors do but in general is still a very fun primer to the topic and the various positions people have staked out in the surrounding debates. I spent the LG15-20 (I think?) time thereabouts on this :P  

*Technically the correct response to this is to not even bring formal logic into subjunctive conditional evaluation, but it's complicated. A lot of energy has been spent on trying to find the correct way to evaluate counterfactuals for sure. And I love Edgington's writing :D 

You have activated Salmon Meerkat's philosophical nerd mode! Type <UNSUB> to switch it off again!

Edited by Salmon Meerkat
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Since the game is over, feel free to update the Guestbook PM (or start a new one if your account doesn't have one) for your anonymous account with some details about the game. The general format of an entry is shown below.

Quote

Game:
Real Username:
Role:
RP Character:

And then other comments below that.

 

 

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49 minutes ago, Chartreuse Penguin said:

guys im sorry

i lied to you


In the last cycle I had copper, not iron. I used the code from Surch for the Lurch, hoping Swan would pick up on it.

@Coral Swan did it work?

 @Sunburst Toucan did my saying I'd protect me or Swan change anything abt your actions?

I did suspect it to be a lie, however I wanted to steer clear of any IKYKs so I went for Ostrich instead, because vote manipulation would have posed serious problems. If I’d known for certain that you had rolled a non-protect metal, I’d have gone for you over Ostrich since you rolling pewter/iron next cycle would have been equally damning. Additionally, while I did think it odd that Swan just magically knew you had Steel last cycle, I discarded the idea of you having used a code since that was not allowed in previous AGs. I should have clarified with the GMs here in any case, not that it would have made a difference. 

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Disclaimer: I'm sorry we're filling the thread like this :P. We didn't get to do it during the game okay we have to do it sometime.

Quote

Actually, no, because your statement implies the law of noncontradiction applies straightforwardly to conditionals and we know it doesn't. In other words: it only works if we assert that counterfactual A and counterfactual B are negations of each other, but just because the consequents are opposed doesn't imply the counterfactual itself is

Or to put it another way:

One can't, unless one is Graham Priest and endorses one of multiple paraconsistent logic systems, assert that P and not-P at the same time. (Note that even Priest is not committed to the claim that it is always the case that P and not-P, only that it is sometimes the case that P and not-P.)

However: it is also not the case that if A, then P, and if A, then not-P actually translate into logical contradictions of each other. (Part of this has to do with the truth table.) Conditionals don't evaluate the same way as naked statements. Some of this boils down to arguments about whether hook is the correct translation of the conditional or not. 

See above. This rests on a contentious translation that contradictory consequents are actually contradictory simpliciter. I also point out that this doesn't work well with multi-value logics and paraconsistent systems. In fact, given you are evaluating counterfactuals by modal logic, you're already looking at a selection of systems, some of which are silent about contradictions.

This is true. We're in agreement.

Given the two statements:

  • If A, then P.
  • If A, then ~P.

It is logically equivalent to:

  • If A, then (P and ~P).

And (P and ~P) can't be true.

However, it is okay for the consequent to be a contradiction. If the antecedent is false, then the whole statement still evaluates to true. In other words, the statement simplifies down to:

  • ~A

And ~A is potentially a true statement. There is no contradiction.

 

However.

That's how material implication works.

It is, as far as I know, not how counterfactual implication works.

If A counterfactually implies P, then that means the following: In the nearest possible reality to our own in which A is true, P is true. (If A is in fact true in the reality we currently live in, then the reality we live in is the nearest possible reality in which A is true, clearly :P This is not very relevant to anything, I just think it's a funny edge case :P)

This semantic is weird :P. Quite a lot weirder than material implication. The whole "possible realities" thing feels vaguely defined by philosophers and just generally offends my mathematical sensibilities, but it is also a necessary part of the discussion, because it is in the definition of a counterfactual. So we are going to have to talk about possible realities >:P.

I am reasonably confident that you're aware of all this, but in case something in my premises is objectionable or even (heavens forbid) outright wrong, I am laying it all out.

 

One of the ways counterfactuals are weird, is that by the very definition, a false premise doesn't automatically make the counterfactual statement true, like it does for material implication. It's a counterfactual. They are mainly useful precisely when the premise is false.

Returning to our example, but with counterfactual statements this time:

  • If A were true, then P would be true.
  • If A were true, then P would not be true.

Again, this is logically equivalent to:

  • If A were true, then (P and ~P) would be true.

This is where the fun begins.

This counterfactual statement presupposes that we are thinking about a reality where A is true. Maybe not the reality we live in, but a reality. Specifically, one that departs from our own reality by the least possible amount in order to make A become true. In that reality, the one where A is true, you are claiming that (P and ~P) is true.

But there is wide agreement that (P and ~P) cannot possibly be true in any reality where the basic known rules of logic still hold sway.

So, in essence, you are claiming that the nearest reality to our own in which A is true, is one in which the basic known rules of logic do not hold sway.

That the shortest possible path to making A become true, involves destroying the foundational tenets of logic.

And that is a claim whose truth value, I think, can reasonably be evaluated.

If A is itself a contradictory statement, then the nearest possible reality in which A is true, would indeed have to be a reality in which contradictions are potentially allowed.

If A is not an inherently contradictory statement, then the nearest possible reality in which A is true, should not be a reality in which contradictions are allowed. Since allowing contradictions would likely represent a much greater departure from our own reality than what is strictly necessary to make A be true.

In essence, this is how the counterfactual statement simplifies:

  • It is necessary in all logically consistent realities that ~A.

This is still potentially true, but it is a somewhat harder thing to argue than just saying A is false in our current reality.

 

Edited to add:

12 hours ago, Salmon Meerkat said:

Edited to add:

image.png

Here's the truth table for S⊃P and S⊃~P (can't really use proper not notation here.) The combined truth table is highlighted in blue. If they were really contradictions, the truth table values we should see is F-F-F-F: contradictions formally defined evaluate as false under all possible truth values in the table. Compare to:

Sir, this is a lovely truth table and very aesthetically pleasing.

However, I am reasonably sure the truth table for the & column should read FFTT not TFTT.

Your overall point about how material implication works is still completely valid, but if I can't catch a break for mistakenly arguing the spiked couldn't possibly have a Thug when they clearly did well then you can't catch a break for making an untrue truth table >:P.

Edited by Charcoal Hyena
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Hello! I can stop saying that I was OOC when really my one RP post was OOC. :P

Anyway, that was a lot of fun! I'm really glad I was able to sub in as Albatross this game. And the big reason why will make sense once our true identities have been revealed. But for now, I just had a lot of fun this game. Even if I was not super active and didn't do a whole lot of crazy analysis or anything. It was just fun to figure out what was going on as it was happening. And to play devil's advocate a lot. Great job to us, village! Though I can't say I did a whole lot to help with that. :P

I'm excited to try and get back into SE more this year. Hopefully.

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image0.jpg

My mood this game, apparently. Sorry to all the villagers I killed, directly or indirectly. In particular, sorry @Sage Kangaroo, @Azure Mouse and @Sapphire Elephant. And @Magenta Albatross

Saving Private Onidsen RP is forthcoming. :ph34r: 

Good game to all. This was marvellous fun, even when I was banging my head against a wall. All the thanks to Elan and Devo as well, for tolerating me, and running a wonderful game :P 

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On 1/22/2023 at 6:46 AM, Charcoal Hyena said:

It is, as far as I know, not how counterfactual implication works.

That much is contentious, because it's not clear how counterfactual implication works!

The point is that no one actually sets out to take a formal logic system and apply it to counterfactual implication: simply put, you can't have it both ways. You can argue that counterfactual implication should be handled by possible world semantics (as indeed, David Lewis and Alan Hajek more or less argue in the vein of), but then possible world semantics don't care about your contradictions, because all that matters is that any given possible world is a consistent state of affairs (note: this blows up if we begin to consider impossible worlds, but the basic form of counterfactual evaluation on this theory only cares about possible worlds, so we'll bracket this.)

But then this means that the Law of Non-Contradiction is not the correct level on which to evaluate counterfactual statements - you simply can't translate two subjunctive conditionals and regard them to straightforwardly be decomposable to A and ~A. You keep on asserting this can be done. This is an extremely major logic system assumption that you have continued to fail to be able to back up. All the systems and frameworks I am mentioning do not even commit to this! (Simply put: it is okay for two counterfactuals to be false if they point to different possible worlds or if there is no unique possible world that can be picked out!)

If you want to bring in the Law of Non-Contradiction, as you just did, you are simply arguing for some form of unity in the evaluation of subjunctive and indicative conditionals. And that's why I'm pointing out that takes us back to the formal logic structure of if-hook and that blows up too because we get wonky results when trying to evaluate counterfactuals as long as we deliberately select for a false antecedent!

On 1/22/2023 at 6:46 AM, Charcoal Hyena said:

Returning to our example, but with counterfactual statements this time:

  • If A were true, then P would be true.
  • If A were true, then P would not be true.

Again, this is logically equivalent to:

  • If A were true, then (P and ~P) would be true.

Is it?

1. You are arguing that this should be handled the same way as an indicative conditional, at the same time as you reject the use of material implication to handle subjunctive conditionals. I invite you to reflect and consider deeply the consistency of this position.

2. Do you think the truth table is the same?

You cannot assert that these two claims are logically equivalent if you both reject material implication and cannot offer a coherent translation of the connector employed.

On 1/22/2023 at 6:46 AM, Charcoal Hyena said:

This counterfactual statement presupposes that we are thinking about a reality where A is true. Maybe not the reality we live in, but a reality. Specifically, one that departs from our own reality by the least possible amount in order to make A become true. In that reality, the one where A is true, you are claiming that (P and ~P) is true.

But there is wide agreement that (P and ~P) cannot possibly be true in any reality where the basic known rules of logic still hold sway.

So, in essence, you are claiming that the nearest reality to our own in which A is true, is one in which the basic known rules of logic do not hold sway.

That the shortest possible path to making A become true, involves destroying the foundational tenets of logic.

And that is a claim whose truth value, I think, can reasonably be evaluated.

See my above comments on possible worlds.

All that is required for if S, then P, and if S, then not-P to both evaluate as false is for there to be no coherent nearest possible S-world we can identify in which P is true. This is fundamentally the swamping neighbourhood argument that Hajek is making. You don't need to postulate an impossible world: you simply need indeterminacy in the nearest neighbours.

I also note the bolded part is not in fact a point of wide agreement - I invite you to consider how well classical logic rules are in fact known to hold sway and the fact we have an entire array of post-classical systems designed specifically to patch the holes in the classical system.

On 1/22/2023 at 6:46 AM, Charcoal Hyena said:

However, I am reasonably sure the truth table for the & column should read FFTT not TFTT.

I'll give you this, sir >:P

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Last night...

Last night, he had been all set to flee. It had been too much, the uncertainty without, the lies within. And then... something shifted.

He thought of the man on the road, Don Quixote, whose name he had stolen. He thought of the time they had walked together, the stories he had heard - what would the hero do here? He thought of the Spiked traitors he had helped expose - how many more could there be, really?

He thought back, through all the lies, remembering his father. How would his father look at him if he knew Char had run, abandoning his friends to their deaths?

He remembered himself. Why was he still running? Here was a chance to redeem himself.

Daux had run from this town once before. He would not do it again.

Char Treuce was done running.

Edited by Chartreuse Penguin
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I have now read through all docs, and they were a read and a half!

Some very good things were brought up and I'm glad for it. 

Also it was hilarious and I need to go dig up my old tunnel meme

Found it, should be Heron industries instead of Kasmir tunnels....forgive my spelling O great Salmon Meerkas

xT3hE-LRlg85ntX9Hsf0aIXKI0chrR_LpxOg2APaYZcKIOl-7KwPuagcvVHzP2gNbKyYS_-HdYqe5aGMo6DyvXOuFwBO6Gca7mA9thzgDZoEyJvGMBZ8clOg1dbT6d8b671S5XJZxAVmSNdHybilquTgGzr-5JCu69qXu_EChIqbQXgaVmk7CTHs4_ez7Q

Praise the Cult of Salmon Meerkat!

Praise EVIL!

Praise Scorp!

And Praise the loss of a single spike! And the descent into madness!

IDK, I got bored and had an interesting idea.


WitLees stood over the pile of charred bones and shattered bottles.

He still had no idea how the little orphan had sequested his entire store of horneater white.

Still it had made a blast and singed his beard! Any explosion that massive required a devote follower. After all, only the best people got to die in explosions! This was what he'd decided after losing a spike. It made total sense!

"Praise Scorp! The largest explosion Tyrian falls has ever seen!"

Reverently Wit set the slightly blackened dog into the hand. Quietly he backed away, avoiding the numerous death sticks stuck into the ground around the site. He had contacted his 'associate' from before. Once again he had paid off and now Wit had the sticks and the alcohol to remember Scorp. The ground was already fed with alcohol, the hand with a roasted dog, now just the words.

"Praise Scorp! The only person who ever bought me out of alcohol!"

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^^^ *decomposing child’s hand makes the thumbs up sign*

It’s so much fun being dead, guys…. it’s nice and hot and toasty down here. They really get me down here, you know. They cured my stutter, gave me a tail and horns and even a nice pointy stick to poke grownups with! I’ve been having so much fun! You should definitely join me down here… well, I mean, I’m sure you all will eventually.

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On 1/23/2023 at 1:17 AM, Salmon Meerkat said:

Simply put: it is okay for two counterfactuals to be false if they point to different possible worlds or if there is no unique possible world that can be picked out!

All that is required for if S, then P, and if S, then not-P to both evaluate as false is for there to be no coherent nearest possible S-world we can identify in which P is true. This is fundamentally the swamping neighbourhood argument that Hajek is making. You don't need to postulate an impossible world: you simply need indeterminacy in the nearest neighbours.

This is an interesting point. I did not previously understand the nuance of Hajek's argument.

Okay, so let's unpack this a bit.

Specifically, let's try and define more rigorously what indeterminacy means in this context.

I would argue, that it does not exactly mean that no unique world can be picked out.

 

Let us examine, for a moment, the following statement:

"If the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter were not π, then the area of a circle would not be πr²."

I am going to argue two things about this statement:

  • Any reasonable definition of counterfactuals should treat this statement as true.
  • This statement cannot possibly be referring to a single coherent nearest possible world.

 

First, here is my proof that this statement cannot possibly be referring to a single coherent nearest possible world (and by extension, that at least some counterfactual statements behave like this one does):

Spoiler

Suppose to the contrary that there is a single nearest possible world where the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter is not π.

Reasonably, we can assume that a world where the ratio is closer to π is nearer to our own than a world where the ratio is further away from π.

This implies that there exists an r ∈ ℝ such that r ≠ π yet r is the closest possible real number to π.

This is a contradiction. The density property of real numbers means that for any r you could try to pick, I could find another real number between r and π. For example, the average of r and π always exists, and it is always closer to π than r is, without equaling π.

Therefore, there is not a single nearest possible world where the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter is not π.

 

While the premise of this counterfactual statement can't possibly have a single nearest possible world, intuitively, I think there are strong reasons to declare that it is still a true statement.

We can imagine a class of possible worlds where the value of π differs, but the laws of geometry and physics and such are still otherwise the same as our own. In such a world, lets say that the new ratio between the circumference of a circle and its diameter is π'. Then, it logically follows that the area of a circle in that world would be π'r², and not πr². In other words, in every single on of these worlds, the consequent of the counterfactual statement is true.

We can imagine another class of possible worlds where both the value of π differs and the laws of geometry and physics differ. Since more things are different from our own world, I would argue that this class of worlds is rather further away from our own world than the above class is.

Therefore, even though there is no coherent single world that the counterfactual statement refers to, the consequent is invariant across all of the worlds that it might refer to. In any world that might be the closest one, the area of a circle is not πr². And this, I feel, is sufficient to make the counterfactual true.

 

I will go a little further than that, and attempt to formally define how I think a counterfactual statement works. Or at least, how it really should work :D I do not know if this is how people define it already.

Spoiler

S ◻→ P is a well-defined statement with an evaluable truth value if and only if the following:

  • There exists some partial ordering of possible worlds that we can agree upon, that states which worlds are nearer or further from our own world.

If S ◻→ P is evaluable, S ◻→ P is true if and only if the following:

  • There exists some set of possible worlds, such that the following is true:
    • For all possible worlds in the set, there does not exist any possible world outside of the set that is at least as close as the world inside the set.
    • For all possible worlds in the set, P.

 

Or, if you want a probabilistic version of this definition, add an agreed upon threshold of certainty as one of the prerequisites for the statement being evaluable, and then replace "all possible worlds" with "a percentage of the possible worlds exceeding your threshold of certainty."

I like this definition quite a bit, actually.

While it may seem like a tall order to have to agree on a partial ordering and potentially a threshold of certainty as well, both of those things have a clear procedure for agreeing on a more general case if you can't agree on specifics. For partial ordering, you can construct a more conservative partial ordering that both parties agree on by stipulating that two possible worlds are considered on equal footing by default, and one only comes before the other if both parties agree that it should be so. For thresholds of certainty, you just take the higher one: if you think that 99% is good enough and another person thinks that 99.9% is good enough, then you both agree that 99.9% is good enough.

 

So, going back to the original statement.

On 1/20/2023 at 11:34 PM, Salmon Meerkat said:

It is false that if counterfactual statements were in fact true, then you would sometimes use them

It is also false that if counterfactuals were in fact true, then you would sometimes not use them

I would argue that this only works if one of two things is true:

  1. There are no possible worlds in which "counterfactual statements are in fact true" is true. Only impossible ones.
  2. There are possible worlds in which "counterfactual statements are in fact true" is true. However, there is no reasonable partial ordering that allows you to draw a neighborhood of "closest worlds" around our own that gives a "clean cut" with respect to either of the consequents: I sometimes use counterfactuals, or I sometimes don't use counterfactuals.

It sounds like you want to falsify the two counterfactuals on the basis of the second case.

In other words, it sounds like you are saying that there are some possible worlds that we can't rule out from being very close to our own, in which I always use counterfactuals, and others in which I never use counterfactuals (even though they are in fact true).

To me, this is a very strange claim.

I believe that any practically near world to our own is probably a world in which I sometimes do use counterfactuals, and sometimes don't.

 

On 1/23/2023 at 1:17 AM, Salmon Meerkat said:

2. Do you think the truth table is the same?

Good question! I don't know :P.

Do truth tables even work for counterfactuals? I'm not sure they do.

Like, what would the rows even be? Possible worlds? Just because there are 4 different permutations of the variables we're looking at, doesn't mean there are only 4 possible worlds. There's potentially infinite possible worlds. On the other hand, in all of those infinite possible worlds there's no guarantee that any of them expresses a particular permutation of the truth values of S and P, so even though 4 rows isn't enough, it might also be too many. So I'm not sure what a truth table actually means in this context.

I feel like part of what counterfactuals are for is that they allow you to reason about systems where you couldn't make a truth table, due to ordinary and practical constraints such as the size of the truth table. This comes at the price that you're required to have some meaningful notion about how similar a world is to our own, and that other people might disagree with you about it.

 

On 1/23/2023 at 1:17 AM, Salmon Meerkat said:

I also note the bolded part is not in fact a point of wide agreement - I invite you to consider how well classical logic rules are in fact known to hold sway and the fact we have an entire array of post-classical systems designed specifically to patch the holes in the classical system.

Wait really? :P

Interesting.

I confess I have doubts about how introducing contradictions patches holes, but I am sure I'm not the only one to have said that.

Some Google searches have turned up paraconsistent logic. Are there other systems I can read about?

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