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Everything posted by Ripheus23

  1. Everyone knows that Sanderson books are too short, especially Stormlight books. What to do about it? A: origami coding. Fold the pages to line up parts of words for more content. B: invisible ink in the margins/spacing. Possibly include magnifying glass with purchase and blacklight for the ink directly. C: invent an alternative English that can be read two ways, so that after reading the actual text in original English, you can start over with second English. In fact, you can do this multiple times, maybe indefinitely, and once translations are brought in... D: coat the paper in mild hallucinogens so readers add their own books to the books while reading. E: start a forum for people to transcribe hallucinations, both chemically induced and meditatively realized.
  2. I don't doubt that the long-term consequences of Autonomy's actions will lead to crisis events, but how deliberately diabolical these would be...?
  3. Then there's Hoid, Hoid, and Hoid
  4. Suppose that Dalinar reinterpreted the Shard of Honor as one of Unity, and this is why he says, "I am Unity." There are a lot of reasons why that doesn't make any sense, but one I didn't think of before was: then why would Odium act surprised, there? He knows Shards can be picked up and reinterpreted. He also knows that Dalinar is not claiming to be Tanavast, after all. In fact, Dalinar is not Tanavast. Odium killed Tanavast and broke the Shard of Honor, but wouldn't it be weird if Odium was screaming at the Shard of Honor in surprise, then? So Unity is something that Odium thinks he killed and is surprised to find alive then---not the Shard of Honor reinterpreted, seemingly. EDIT: Gah, this is supposed to be in the SA forum.
  5. Not King of Ways, King of Words... Killer of Worlds? I think that's a book name already. Kindness of Worth, Keeper of Woe, Kite of Wrath, Knowledge of Wisdom, Key of Whispers, Kitten of Wrong, Kayak of Wombats, Knot of Wreaths, ...???
  6. More particularly, can a strong concept of free will be proved? Let us say that we are looking for the kind of free will involved in the representation of "Choose Your Own Adventure" books: same conditions at time t but divergent outcomes at t+. Then not, "They were free to do otherwise if they had chosen otherwise," but, "They were free to choose otherwise in the first place." The basic argument from moral concepts is that, if ought-implies-can, then when we do as we ought not, we could've done otherwise; ergo... This has proven less convincing than it was supposed to be (one major philosopher, Immanuel Kant, made it the touchstone of his argument for strong free will), among other things due to doubts about the unrestricted license for "ought-implies-can." However, let us suppose that a "moral fact" would always correspond to some imperative. Then, "X is right," corresponds to, "Do X." So let us focus on imperatives themselves. Now an assertion is semantically satisified if it is true, whereas an imperative is semantically satisfied if it is complied with. "This sentence is true," has for a counterpart, "Comply with this imperative" (and then the paradoxical, "This sentence is false," maps to the paradoxical, "Don't comply with this imperative"). So imperatives are "action-guiding." I think it can be quickly demonstrated that this condition requires strong free will to "make sense." Let's start with an intuitive statement: "An imperative I holds if and only if I can be complied with for the sake of being complied with." We will not elaborate much on this word "holds," here. Roughly, it is a concept of semantic satisfaction (again), this time one that is applied such that an imperative I is "meaningless" just in case I doesn't hold. The individual words used in the imperative might be meaningful, true. But imagine that you have a friend F and you are in Antarctica and F is in northern Canada. You say out loud, "F, don't let the dogs out." Your command is meaningful partwise, but supposing F can't hear you when you issue it, then your command doesn't hold for F. Even if F doesn't let the dogs out, this is not "for the sake of" complying with your command since F is unaware of your command. Next, immediately, an imperative doesn't hold if it can't be complied with at all, i.e. if the command is to do something impossible. Or if you are already doing what someone then tells you to do, or if some outside force is forcing you to independently do such a thing, then again this what-you-are-told-to-do isn't being complied with for the sake of compliance, but for some other reason. And it wouldn't work to say that, by commanding someone to do something, I then cause them to do this thing: the way imperatives are addressed inherently represents addressees as the ones meant to cause compliance. So it seems that, for an imperative to hold, the corresponding action must be possible, but also contingent. Voila, imperative semantics requires disjunctive free will. This is all well and done, but the rejoinder could just be, "Then imperatives are never really meaningful as such." That is, one of the same things we might have said about moral concepts, we can say about all imperatives, moral or not. Our faculty of imperatives is an "error" in our neural circuitry, or whatever along these lines. This won't do, though. First, consider an imperative like, "Don't think of cats." In understanding it, you can't help but think of cats. So in essence, even the meaning of individual words requires imperative transyntax in the background. The meaning of an individual word W is always in part an imperative like, "Refer to the referent of W." But if this is true, then all meaning whatsoever requires free will. That's an incredible conclusion to come to, but it can be defended very well. Consider the place of sentences like, "Let such and such be the case," or, "Allow that..." or, "Assume that..." in deductive reasoning. Axiomatic assertions are in effect commonly introduced by imperative transyntax. Moreover, rules of inference have an imperative form: modus ponens can be thought of along the lines of not just the assertion that "If A then B; A; therefore B" but as "from, 'if A then B,' and, 'A,' infer, 'B.'" Indeed, without this form, modus ponens enters the vicious circle discussed in e.g. Godel, Escher, and Bach (namely, it figures in a "proof of itself" that presupposes the thing to be proved). Or consider erotetic transyntax, too (the logic of questions). Let us suppose that iterated skepticism ends with self-answering questions. In other words, to the person who keeps asking, "How do you know...?" the trick is not to keep offering assertions that the skeptic then just questions, but to ask the skeptic a question that will commit them to an assertion, namely, "What do you mean by, 'How do you know?'?" Granted this, it becomes evident enough that the faculty of inquiry in itself is at the heart of the solution to issues of proof, evidence, rational belief, etc. Facts about this faculty are among the fundamental facts of axiomatic and other assertoric systems. They are on a par with laws like, "No contradiction is ever true," or, "Not-not X reduces to X," in assertoric logic. No less is true than that the essence of the faculty of inquiry is even the source of our "justification" for accepting the law of noncontradiction, etc. (or rather: if this law is provable in a way that doesn't "beg the question," it is with reference to the nature of all questions as such---to be sure, at this point, we would just import Aristotle's, "Those who don't accept this law, fail to use the concept of negation in the first place, then," but our importation is shown to be very well-motivated). Even if we didn't say "all meaning requires imperative transyntax," it would not be hard to illustrate how erotetic meaning "requires" (or is automatically interpolated with) this. First, there is a theory of erotetic functions that says that a question encodes an imperative to decide the question. E.g., "What day is it?" corresponds to, "Tell me what day it is." Asking someone, "What day is it?" is the same thing as telling them to tell you what day it is. (Well, as long as our question is not rhetorical, anyway...) Without accepting this encoding as a reduction, we can accept it (the traditional view is reductive, though). So, if erotetic logic "grounds" the axioms of assertoric logic, then its counterpart imperative transyntax assumes its fundamental place in logic such that free will is, once more, implicated in the form of all knowledge (including all knowledge of meaning). Luckily(?), we can do even better than this.* Go back to the notion that moral assertions are mirrored by moral imperatives. In fact, there is a question whether moral concepts are ever assertoric as such in the first place. But what we can say, then, is that even if we "just start out with" imperatives, there is a basic erotetic function that enfolds imperatives into an assertoric form, i.e. transcreates the very form of moral assertions. This is the question, "Why?" as in, "Why do X?" An answer to this question will be an assertion that some J = why. So if moral logic emerges from the fusion of all the forms of transyntax (assertoric, imperative, and erotetic**) and if these forms of transyntax have axiomatic value across the board, then we can even bring back "ought-implies-can" as a fundamental fact about all knowledge and meaning whatsoever(!). This is truly said anyway inasmuch as we have to find a formal harmony between deontic and modal logic; but at this stage, the proof is sufficient (the bridge of deontic and modal logic then being "icing on the cake"). *[Or: the ability to ask questions is itself the metaphysical source of free will. Viz., this ability allows us to question not just individual cause-and-effect (deterministic) claims, but the entire claim of causation (determinism) itself. The initial semantic underdetermination of questions (e.g. the essence of expressions like "what," "who," "where," and so on, in erotetic space) is tantamount of an indeterministic circuit of causality, from within erotetic space. Think of it like this: suppose "desires cause all our actions." Then we would tend to say that, if I desire a piece of cake, this will cause me to move towards a piece of cake, etc. But what if we "desire to act indeterministically"? What will this desire cause? If it causes anything, it doesn't seem as if it would deterministically cause things. Or, not completely deterministically... Likewise, if a pure question were a cause, it doesn't seem as if it would be able to force its possible effects to be limited to one and only one outcome.] **[For the empiricist-minded: it is an empirical fact that these are the only forms of transyntax that universally exist in natural language. Or so I have heard (quote me on this if it would please you so...).] ... Also, despite its novel intricacy, this entire line of argument hearkens back to (A) the theory that "private language" being impossible is a priori proof of "other minds" and an "external world" (referring to Wittgensteinian/Putnamian reasons on these scores) and (B) the notion that knowledge can't be arbitrarily caused by outside factors (a la the normative idea of epistemology, e.g. re: Jaegwon Kim). To be sure, (B)-arguments are usually not strongly formed; my argument, though it vitiates the (B)-ones, has to be set up in a stronger way.
  7. I have a notion of free will as involving the structure of time, such that we don't always or even perhaps mostly make choices "moment by moment." Free will ranges over entire line-segments (of the timeline), sometimes, consolidating our actions over periods of time. So once a word's meaning is learned, the chain of thought behind that learning gets consolidated, so it doesn't manifest as a "decision" to know what words mean, each time we use a word. I guess, to a degree, that decision has already been partly made, by the time we learn the word. But then think of those moments when you say a word over and over again and its meaning seems to sort of dissipate? I wonder if that's relevant to what I'm saying... In my model, I guess this appears at the erotetic level. Here, thought has an assertion function, but also a question function. The question function is the one that allows us to directly keep ascending the staircase of recursion (always taking itself as an input...).
  8. For some reason, the 16/17 thing about the Shards has always subtly reminded me of something, but I couldn't figure it out. The closest was thinking that the 16 might be relevant to a personality test. However, within the last few days, I finally remembered. The Outer Planes from D&D. I don't know what state the D&D cosmologies are at today, but while I was growing up, they were still roughly at the, "Sixteen Outer Planes surrounding a seventeeth," stage. Now, the logic behind them is morally slanted, plus only really requires nine examples, but let's imagine that there's a vague possible mapping from the Outer Planes to the Shards, with the 17th Shard being the neutral "center." Here are my guesses: Odium: The Gray Wastes (from Wikipedia: "Here, all emotion and compassion is drained away, until only hopelessness, selfishness and apathy remain"). Dominion: Baator Ruin: The Abyss Mechanus: Preservation (Wiki: "This clockwork plane is the ultimate in order") Having a heck of a time with Cultivation, maybe Arcadia, the Beastlands, or Arborea Honor: Ysgard ("The eternal battleground where true heroes prove their valor": Tranquiline Halls much? though this depends on how much of the TH mythos is Honor's) Devotion: Elysium Autonomy: Limbo Ambition: Pandemonium Endowment: Bytopia (only "link": the term "BioChromatic Breath") EDIT: Possible extra Shards Ingenuity/Wisdom and Grief = have neutral planar counterparts? Also if Honor is not Ysgard, he's Celestia, maybe.
  9. Two things, though. Well, three even, but anyway, first, Odium isn't actually "Passion." That's a complex lie of his. The Dawnchant description of Odium was of something that drained all emotion, leaving a void. Second, supposing Sanderson was inspired enough by any of this to incorporate it into the Shards, it had to have been going back some years, before the planes got these mechanisms tagged to them? Third, but this is just me, I always preferred yugoloths over baatezu and tanarii, on a conceptual level. I mean, I held strongly to that "neutral good is most good, neutral evil is most evil" notion (I started out as chaotic good but then found out it wasn't "pure" good, so I switched to neutral good, etc.). I feel like Odium's evil is great enough to be the closest in the cosmere (of the Shards we've seen) to pure evil. Now granted, the yugoloths also have a major hub in Gehenna, it's where their lord is after all, but otherwise, the yugoloths supposedly originating in Hades also pushes me in the Odium:Hades direction.
  10. The concept of True Words

    This was a concept I liked a lot in fantasy, but couldn't reconcile with the way the concept was executed. My take on it was to suppose a moral codex where each kind of good action corresponded to a letter, so that performing a sequence of good actions meant "spelling out a word" and then forming "sentences" and so on. Anyway, someone with a name in the language of good actions would have that for their True Name, and a True Word would be a word for a thing in this language.

  11. Whom watcheth the watchethmen
  12. If any of this was an indication of anything, that leaves three more evil (from our POV, or whatever) Shards, one for a prison-plane, one for some floating volcanoes or what IIRC, but where one of the ultimate fiend-lords dwells, and one for another battle-plane. Preservation, maybe.
  13. The key to defeating Odium is to arrange a marriage for him... ... to Taravangian. The Stormfather again officiates, hence the title.
  14. I will square the circle, even if it is impossible.
  15. OMG Knights of Honor's Truth Knife of Heaven's Treasure Knowledge of Hope Knowledge of Wind Ketek of Highstorms House of Worldsingers
  16. Mwahahaha Knowledge of Wailing Tentacles, Keep of Worrisome Turtles, Kiln of Weaponized Terebinths. King of Wriggling Teetotalers. Knights of Whistling Tomatoes.
  17. "Since ZFC provides us with the resources to construct ultrapowers, we can construct inner models using mice."

  18. Kelp of Wiggles. Krill of Whales. Knurl of Whirls. Kerfluffle of Whiplash. EDIT: Kettle of Worms, Kaleidoscope of Wishes, Kiosk of Windows, Keel of Wolves, Knell of Wilting, Knee of Wit, Koala of Width, Knife of Worship, Karaoke of Wealth.
  19. Sanderson also uses the phrase "one-to-one correspondence" periodically (in WoBs). In set theory, the word "cardinality" was originally read off the notion of suits and ranks in decks of cards (the example being 4 suits X 13 ranks giving you a "set with a cardinality of 52"). 1-to-1 correspondence ends up being crucial to defining "different sizes of infinite cardinalities." I wonder if there's anything about the Physical-Cognitive interface that suggests you could get a lot of indirect magical power from thinking about infinite sets. My guess is that there is, that the Set are either on to the problem or know (part of) its solution, etc.
  20. Kiss of Wonder
  21. "The souls of the lepidoptera finalitas contain prophecies. Think of them like flying fortune cakes..." "Be gentle! Heed the lepidoptera..."

    And they said:

    "Hither! Purple whispers creep! The noose is loose! Kitten and a kaboose!"

    "There are 9.23 grams of marmalade dried to the base of Mrs. Losensky's blue ceramic bucket..."

    "I woke up one morning to find that my nose had detached itself from my face and been transformed into a hideous, lavender-scented aardvark..."

    "Apollyon likes bloody omelets..."

    "There seem to be a few problems with the argument: it is too long and only quotes The Minstrel of Lettuce..."

    "The quotient of a positive shirt and a negative shirt is a set of four-legged pants..."

    "Good grief, it looks like I missed the coronation of my skeleton's last remarks..."

    "What a mighty! I! What!"

    "My nephews never believed that I used the abacus for firewood to power my mitten-crinkling machine..."

    "Tsk. As if YOU had ever shaken hands with the Form of Handshakes..."

  22. Can't believe I didn't think of "Wind." Oooh, what about "Wraith"? Also, super-wordplay it would be if the K was for "ketek"...
  23. I realized that there's a difference between proving "x is not a set of anything" and proving "x is a set of nothing," and I needed to prove that the ur-element is not a set of no elements of any set, including itself. I think I worked it out* but anyway, another result of the model was that while zero is an empty subset of other sets (a set with no elements of any other sets), so all other sets are empty subsets of zero (sets of no elements of zero). So this underscores why for all natural numbers n besides 0, the powerset is uniquely 2 to the power of n, whereas 0 to the power of 0, 1 to the power of 0, 2 the power of zero... 1 to the power of 1, 1 to the power of 2, 1 to the power of 3... = 0 ^^2 = 1 ^^ 2 = 1. <So zero is the only number before aleph-zero that has an infinite number of powerset expressions.>

    *my idea is that "being a set of no elements of x" means being 0 (in relation to other numbers) and being other numbers (in relation to zero). But the relation is never defined on the ur-element. More, then, we can just define the ur-element such that it it is not a set of no elements of other sets, nor itself. In conjunction with the ur-element's not being a set of anything either, it follows that it is not a set of anything or nothing, which rules out the ur-element being a set.

    1. Ripheus23


      minotaur elements

      minotaur ordinals

      dragon ordinals

      unicorn ordinals

      Orpheus surreals

      Osirus ordinals

      Amaterasu cardinals [again]

      Ragnarok cardinals

      Michael cardinals

      Raphael ordinals

      Gabriel surreals

      Asmodeus surreals

      warlock ordinals

      sorcerer ordinals

      wizard cardinals

      sortilege ordinals

      demonic cardinals

      leviathan transet

      "kenotic transet" <said of the ur-element> and "pleromatic set"

      happy cardinals

      sad ordinals

      priestly cardinals

      hieratic ordinals

      sword cardinals

      sword ordinals

      nuclear cardinals

      nuclear ordinals

      nuclear surreals

      presbyter cardinals

      deacon cardinals

      "reformed cardinals" <so large only divine revelation can give knowledge of them>

      Ezekiel cardinals

      Oberon numbers

      Aquinas cardinals

      Nicean cardinals

      irminsul ordinals

      Odysseus ordinals

      Aeneas surreals

      Milwaukee cardinals ("a kind of joke cardinal")

      cheddar ordinal

      parmesan cardinal

      cola ordinal

      hemlock ordinal

      Icarus transet

      ambrosiac cardinal

      cowardly cardinal

      cowardly ordinal

      helpless surreal

      potato surreal

      guitar cardinal

      piano ordinal [haha]

      Deseret cardinal

  24. Anselm cardinals. A transet in V proposed by the "cult of the universal constructor." Its elements are supposed to be "cardinals so large that only divine power could have brought them into being" or give them a reference. Note that this concept therefore requires that Anselm numbers be transfinally ordered, making the first Anselm number into the meridian of a nexus <where the Anselm section of V is the "greatest" section>.

    cult of the universal constructor, the. Believers in a transcreationist model of the Godelian universal constructor. Their leader is Cardinal Mahlo [finally!], who is actually secretly working with the Septarch of Commandment (also known as Deonomy). According to the cult, it is not provable whether empirical reality was created by a divine nature, but it is provable whether mathematical reality was transcreated by a divine nature. <The argument goes: there is a possible mathematical world that was transcreated; therefore there is a possible transcreatrix; if something is a transcreatrix, it is this necessarily; therefore the transcreatrix, if it exists for any possible mathematical world, exists for all of them.>

    Godelian universal constructor. An entity whose existence is supported by Godel's ontological argument. Similar to the necessary agent.

    necessary agent, the. Posit of naive deontic logic: there is an obligation that exists purely from logical grounds (an obligation to "uphold" the law of non-contradiction), wherefore there is always (necessarily) an agent able to discharge the obligation. In ecograph theory, this posit is actually a principle for the manifestation of different kinds of "necessary" agents.

    Deonomy. The Septarch empowered by divine-command theory. He was also the first ecoarch to manipulate the Keyscape in order to the Septatheon. (Note that ecoarchs are already a peculiar kind of "necessary agent.")

    1. Ripheus23


      <Why are Anselm cardinals not defined as "none greater than which can be conceived"? First, in context, there is no individual such cardinal. Second, this definition is implicit in the notion of a transfinal ordering, which attaches to the base definition by virtue of saying "divine nature" there, since a divine nature is one that transfinally orders things <or so the theory goes>. Of course, those who accepted the existence of Amida cardinals thought otherwise: these were "so large that only a mathematician gifted with divine power could access them." But these mathematicians with this gift need not be divine "inherently," only called that by reference to the power at issues (which power could well be impersonal, as in the so-called Tian model).>

  25. Next step/stage.


    1. Ripheus23


      "X is a set" becomes "X has at least one element Y."

    2. Ripheus23


      *Regarding zero: Z = {Z}, Z ~= element of ~Z, for all X, if X is not Z then X ~= an element of Z. "Zero is an element of itself, is not an element of any other set, and has no other elements besides itself." By contrast, "The ur-element is not an element of itself, is an element of only one set, and is the only element of that set" = 1.