Charcoal Hyena

I just missed the night, and I'm sorry I wasn't here at all. I don't even have an excuse. Currently going back through and reading all of Falcons posts and interactions and taking notes - as well as reading through the night to see what happened there. Won't have much commentary until I get through that. Once I've finished that I'll be posting a reads list and hopefully going through my reasoning for all of them.

I was going to RP a bit but honestly there is too much going on in this thread - any time I'd have to type it up will instead be spent on the reading the thread over and over again. I just almost removed my vote on Falcon and put it onto Charcoal Hyena... before I realized that was me. Falcon - Mellon Dingo Mainly just a poke vote, for now at least. Judging people for sleeping is kinda rude.

While I can agree that it was poor form going with gut reads the only ones who stood out to me were Falcon and Mouse as negative gut reads - and the only reason I can think of for that was that they both were using memes to communicate. Other than that my gut is staying quiet so far, so it was down to using either a prejudice gut-read or a random guess, and at least my gut read started a bit of conversation. That being said I have no one else to vote for still so I'll be keeping it where it is for now While I can agree that it was poor form going with gut reads the only ones who stood out to me were Falcon and Mouse as negative gut reads - and the only reason I can think of for that was that they both were using memes to communicate. Other than that my gut is staying quiet so far, so it was down to using either a prejudice gut-read or a random guess, and at least my gut read started a bit of conversation. That being said I have no one else to vote for still so I'll be keeping it where it is for now While I can agree that it was poor form going with gut reads the only ones who stood out to me were Falcon and Mouse as negative gut reads - and the only reason I can think of for that was that they both were using memes to communicate. Other than that my gut is staying quiet so far, so it was down to using either a prejudice gut-read or a random guess, and at least my gut read started a bit of conversation. That being said I have no one else to vote for still so I'll be keeping it where it is for now

Not going to lie got confused on time and came here 12 hours after the thread open and now feel slightly overwhelmed that there's already three pages But thats life I guess. Or death considering that is what we deal in. Currently a bit distracted with work/school/some-other-societal obligation so I don't have time to do a super thorough analysis of what's going on but for now I'll be throwing a vote on Emerald Falcon Nothing against you I just really struggle with the meme format so its slightly soured my gut opinion of you. I think it looks fun though! Just doesn't work for me, sorry.

This is an interesting point. I did not previously understand the nuance of Hajek's argument. Okay, so let's unpack this a bit. Specifically, let's try and define more rigorously what indeterminacy means in this context. I would argue, that it does not exactly mean that no unique world can be picked out. Let us examine, for a moment, the following statement: "If the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter were not π, then the area of a circle would not be πr²." I am going to argue two things about this statement: Any reasonable definition of counterfactuals should treat this statement as true. This statement cannot possibly be referring to a single coherent nearest possible world. First, here is my proof that this statement cannot possibly be referring to a single coherent nearest possible world (and by extension, that at least some counterfactual statements behave like this one does): While the premise of this counterfactual statement can't possibly have a single nearest possible world, intuitively, I think there are strong reasons to declare that it is still a true statement. We can imagine a class of possible worlds where the value of π differs, but the laws of geometry and physics and such are still otherwise the same as our own. In such a world, lets say that the new ratio between the circumference of a circle and its diameter is π'. Then, it logically follows that the area of a circle in that world would be π'r², and not πr². In other words, in every single on of these worlds, the consequent of the counterfactual statement is true. We can imagine another class of possible worlds where both the value of π differs and the laws of geometry and physics differ. Since more things are different from our own world, I would argue that this class of worlds is rather further away from our own world than the above class is. Therefore, even though there is no coherent single world that the counterfactual statement refers to, the consequent is invariant across all of the worlds that it might refer to. In any world that might be the closest one, the area of a circle is not πr². And this, I feel, is sufficient to make the counterfactual true. I will go a little further than that, and attempt to formally define how I think a counterfactual statement works. Or at least, how it really should work I do not know if this is how people define it already. I like this definition quite a bit, actually. While it may seem like a tall order to have to agree on a partial ordering and potentially a threshold of certainty as well, both of those things have a clear procedure for agreeing on a more general case if you can't agree on specifics. For partial ordering, you can construct a more conservative partial ordering that both parties agree on by stipulating that two possible worlds are considered on equal footing by default, and one only comes before the other if both parties agree that it should be so. For thresholds of certainty, you just take the higher one: if you think that 99% is good enough and another person thinks that 99.9% is good enough, then you both agree that 99.9% is good enough. So, going back to the original statement. I would argue that this only works if one of two things is true: There are no possible worlds in which "counterfactual statements are in fact true" is true. Only impossible ones. There are possible worlds in which "counterfactual statements are in fact true" is true. However, there is no reasonable partial ordering that allows you to draw a neighborhood of "closest worlds" around our own that gives a "clean cut" with respect to either of the consequents: I sometimes use counterfactuals, or I sometimes don't use counterfactuals. It sounds like you want to falsify the two counterfactuals on the basis of the second case. In other words, it sounds like you are saying that there are some possible worlds that we can't rule out from being very close to our own, in which I always use counterfactuals, and others in which I never use counterfactuals (even though they are in fact true). To me, this is a very strange claim. I believe that any practically near world to our own is probably a world in which I sometimes do use counterfactuals, and sometimes don't. Good question! I don't know . Do truth tables even work for counterfactuals? I'm not sure they do. Like, what would the rows even be? Possible worlds? Just because there are 4 different permutations of the variables we're looking at, doesn't mean there are only 4 possible worlds. There's potentially infinite possible worlds. On the other hand, in all of those infinite possible worlds there's no guarantee that any of them expresses a particular permutation of the truth values of S and P, so even though 4 rows isn't enough, it might also be too many. So I'm not sure what a truth table actually means in this context. I feel like part of what counterfactuals are for is that they allow you to reason about systems where you couldn't make a truth table, due to ordinary and practical constraints such as the size of the truth table. This comes at the price that you're required to have some meaningful notion about how similar a world is to our own, and that other people might disagree with you about it. Wait really? Interesting. I confess I have doubts about how introducing contradictions patches holes, but I am sure I'm not the only one to have said that. Some Google searches have turned up paraconsistent logic. Are there other systems I can read about?

Oh yea the dead doc was having a fun time with that I should have known better than to bet against your ability to paranoia, though, Swan

Disclaimer: I'm sorry we're filling the thread like this :P. We didn't get to do it during the game okay we have to do it sometime. This is true. We're in agreement. Given the two statements: If A, then P. If A, then ~P. It is logically equivalent to: If A, then (P and ~P). And (P and ~P) can't be true. However, it is okay for the consequent to be a contradiction. If the antecedent is false, then the whole statement still evaluates to true. In other words, the statement simplifies down to: ~A And ~A is potentially a true statement. There is no contradiction. However. That's how material implication works. It is, as far as I know, not how counterfactual implication works. If A counterfactually implies P, then that means the following: In the nearest possible reality to our own in which A is true, P is true. (If A is in fact true in the reality we currently live in, then the reality we live in is the nearest possible reality in which A is true, clearly This is not very relevant to anything, I just think it's a funny edge case ) This semantic is weird . Quite a lot weirder than material implication. The whole "possible realities" thing feels vaguely defined by philosophers and just generally offends my mathematical sensibilities, but it is also a necessary part of the discussion, because it is in the definition of a counterfactual. So we are going to have to talk about possible realities >:P. I am reasonably confident that you're aware of all this, but in case something in my premises is objectionable or even (heavens forbid) outright wrong, I am laying it all out. One of the ways counterfactuals are weird, is that by the very definition, a false premise doesn't automatically make the counterfactual statement true, like it does for material implication. It's a counterfactual. They are mainly useful precisely when the premise is false. Returning to our example, but with counterfactual statements this time: If A were true, then P would be true. If A were true, then P would not be true. Again, this is logically equivalent to: If A were true, then (P and ~P) would be true. This is where the fun begins. This counterfactual statement presupposes that we are thinking about a reality where A is true. Maybe not the reality we live in, but a reality. Specifically, one that departs from our own reality by the least possible amount in order to make A become true. In that reality, the one where A is true, you are claiming that (P and ~P) is true. But there is wide agreement that (P and ~P) cannot possibly be true in any reality where the basic known rules of logic still hold sway. So, in essence, you are claiming that the nearest reality to our own in which A is true, is one in which the basic known rules of logic do not hold sway. That the shortest possible path to making A become true, involves destroying the foundational tenets of logic. And that is a claim whose truth value, I think, can reasonably be evaluated. If A is itself a contradictory statement, then the nearest possible reality in which A is true, would indeed have to be a reality in which contradictions are potentially allowed. If A is not an inherently contradictory statement, then the nearest possible reality in which A is true, should not be a reality in which contradictions are allowed. Since allowing contradictions would likely represent a much greater departure from our own reality than what is strictly necessary to make A be true. In essence, this is how the counterfactual statement simplifies: It is necessary in all logically consistent realities that ~A. This is still potentially true, but it is a somewhat harder thing to argue than just saying A is false in our current reality. Edited to add: Sir, this is a lovely truth table and very aesthetically pleasing. However, I am reasonably sure the truth table for the & column should read FFTT not TFTT. Your overall point about how material implication works is still completely valid, but if I can't catch a break for mistakenly arguing the spiked couldn't possibly have a Thug when they clearly did well then you can't catch a break for making an untrue truth table >:P.

Sir are you sure? >:P If counterfactuals were in fact true, then you are saying that both I wouldn't sometimes use them and I wouldn't sometimes not use them. In other words, it seems that in this hypothetical world I would use both use counterfactuals all of the time and use counterfactuals none of the time. If this was what you were implying, this would be an obvious contradiction. It comes down to whether you took my antecedent to imply that counterfactuals people use are generally true, or took it to the extreme that counterfactuals are all true without exception. In the former case, even if you don't believe that counterfactuals are generally true, and thus that the nearest reality to our own in which counterfactuals were generally true is not in fact the reality we live in, it is unlikely that this reality is one in which logical contradictions are permitted, as that would very likely constitute a much more dramatic departure from our current reality than is strictly necessary to make counterfactuals become generally true. In the latter case, in any hypothetical world where all counterfactuals are true, it is likely necessary that brazen logical contradictions are permitted, so in that case feel free to carry on, I suppose.

If counterfactual statements were in fact true, then I would sometimes use them >:P.

:eyes: I suppose the alternative is that you lie about everything, so the linguist scan of whether you're lying is functionally useless.

Dunno sir, but it occurs to me that phrasing everything as a question to avoid technically lying is one of the oldest tricks in the book.

Is there some other situation on your mind where this is happening? >:P Say, hypothetically, you warned people not to do something and they're doing it anyway? >:P

That sounds like an admission that you lied to other people though doesn't it >:(. Technically, you never actually talked to me in-game, although due to the extensive PM I inherited between you and the previous Charcoal Hyena, it feels like we have spoken :P. If you didn't lie to anyone else, then riddle me this: how do you explain the fact that everyone thinks you're Kasimir, huh? I know for a fact that you're really Kjell.

https://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/SuspiciouslySpecificDenial

We did! AG8 wasn't a fluke! Or a flounder. Or a mackerel. Studies have shown that it was, in fact, an SE game and not a fish. Darn right! Mission accomplished . Ah yes, the spiritual successor to sans serif . I was only in the game for, what, 2 day turns? (Admittedly 3.5 night turns.) Not very long in the grand scheme of things, before getting dusted off. Well, hopefully the previous Charcoal Hyena approves of what I did with the time. Which, if I'm being honest, was mostly to make funny PMs while putting off rereading the previous cycles. And occasionally voting for a different spiked than the one who was getting bandwagonned into oblivion at the time, for diversity's sake. Honestly, pinch-hitting is fun. Maybe I should do it more often. In any case, good game, all .